Lockwood M
University of Oxford.
J Med Ethics. 1997 Feb;23(1):42-4. doi: 10.1136/jme.23.1.42.
Howsepian has presented a number of thought experiments, which are designed to undermine my claim that our identity through time is grounded in the continued existence of those structures in our brains which directly underlie mental functioning. I argue that the conclusions which Howsepian draws from these thought experiments are mistaken, and that his discussion of them is vitiated, in particular, by his failure to distinguish between personal identity and the identity of the associated human organism.
霍塞皮安提出了一些思想实验,其目的是削弱我的主张,即我们随时间推移的身份认同基于我们大脑中那些直接支撑心理功能的结构的持续存在。我认为霍塞皮安从这些思想实验中得出的结论是错误的,而且他对这些实验的讨论存在缺陷,尤其是他未能区分个人身份与相关人类有机体的身份。