洛克伍德论人类身份与原条。
Lockwood on human identity and the primitive streak.
作者信息
Howsepian A A
机构信息
University of California, Fresno, USA.
出版信息
J Med Ethics. 1997 Feb;23(1):38-41. doi: 10.1136/jme.23.1.38.
Michael Lockwood has recently concluded that it can be morally permissible to perform potentially damaging non-therapeutic experiments on live human (pre)embryos. The reasons he provides in support of this conclusion commit him inter alia to the following controversial theses: (i) an organism's potential for twinning bears critically on the identity conditions for that organism; and (ii) functionally intact mentality-mediating neurological structures play a critical role in establishing the identity conditions for human organisms. I argue that Lockwood has given us no good reason to endorse either of these theses and, hence, that he has given us no good reason to believe that it can be morally permissible to perform potentially damaging non-therapeutic experiments on live human (pre)embryos.
迈克尔·洛克伍德最近得出结论，对活体人类（ pre ）胚胎进行具有潜在损害性的非治疗性实验在道德上可能是允许的。他为支持这一结论所提供的理由尤其使他认同以下有争议的论点：（ i ）生物体的孪生可能性对该生物体的身份条件至关重要；以及（ ii ）功能完好的心理调节神经结构在确定人类生物体的身份条件方面起着关键作用。我认为，洛克伍德没有给我们充分的理由来支持这两个论点中的任何一个，因此，他也没有给我们充分的理由相信对活体人类（ pre ）胚胎进行具有潜在损害性的非治疗性实验在道德上是允许的。
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