Macrae J, Bradbury M, Jaspars S, Johnson D, Duffield M
University of Birmingham.
Disasters. 1997 Sep;21(3):223-43. doi: 10.1111/1467-7717.00058.
The concept of the 'relief-to-development continuum' has been the subject of renewed interest in recent years. Concerned by the rise in relief budgets over the past decade and the absolute fall in development aid resources, support has been growing for the concept of developmental relief. In the context of complex political emergencies, it has been argued further that as effective development aid can reduce vulnerability to the impact of natural hazards, so it might also be used to contribute to a process of conflict prevention. In this way, the concept of the relief-development continuum has become entwined with broader discussions about the contribution of official development assistance management. Drawing on a Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), this paper cautions against uncritical application of the concept of the continuum in complex political emergencies and rehabilitation in particular, in the current Sudanese context. It argues that in order to move legitimately from relief aid programming to development aid programming, three fundamental conditions must be in place: first, a minimum level of security, respect for human rights and humanitarian access. Second, empirical evidence from the field needs to demonstrate that the emergency is over. Finally, moving from relief to development aid programming is contingent on donor governments accepting the legitimacy of national governmental structures and of the rebel movements. In other words, for donor governments, moving along the continuum is in significant part determined by foreign policy considerations, not only technical ones. Consideration needs to be given to the actual and perceived legitimation of the different movements that a move to rehabilitation might be seen to imply. The paper argues that none of these conditions had been satisfied in Sudan by mid-1997. Instead of a process of normalisation paving the way to long-term development, the current situation in Sudan is better described as a chronic political emergency. In such a context, uncritical pursuit of developmental strategies may negatively affect the welfare of conflict-affected populations.
“从救济到发展连续体”的概念近年来再度受到关注。鉴于过去十年救济预算的增加以及发展援助资源的绝对下降，对发展性救济概念的支持日益增加。在复杂的政治紧急情况背景下，有人进一步认为，由于有效的发展援助可以减少遭受自然灾害影响的脆弱性，因此它也可用于促进预防冲突的进程。这样一来，救济与发展连续体的概念已与关于官方发展援助管理贡献的更广泛讨论交织在一起。本文借鉴对苏丹生命线行动（OLS）的审查，告诫不要在复杂的政治紧急情况，特别是当前苏丹背景下的恢复工作中不加批判地应用连续体概念。文章认为，为了从救济援助规划合法地转向发展援助规划，必须具备三个基本条件：第一，最低限度的安全、对人权的尊重和人道主义准入。第二，实地的实证证据需要表明紧急情况已经结束。最后，从救济转向发展援助规划取决于捐助国政府接受国家政府结构和反叛运动的合法性。换句话说，对于捐助国政府而言，沿着连续体推进在很大程度上是由外交政策考虑决定的，而不仅仅是技术因素。需要考虑向恢复工作转变可能意味着的不同运动的实际和感知合法性。文章认为，到1997年年中，苏丹没有一个条件得到满足。苏丹目前的局势并非是正常化进程为长期发展铺平道路，而更宜被描述为长期的政治紧急情况。在这种背景下，不加批判地推行发展战略可能会对受冲突影响民众的福祉产生负面影响。
