Bergstrom C T, Lachmann M
Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, USA.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 1998 Apr 28;95(9):5100-5. doi: 10.1073/pnas.95.9.5100.
The Sir Philip Sidney game has been used by numerous authors to show how signal cost can facilitate honest signaling among relatives. Here, we demonstrate that, in this game, honest cost-free signals are possible as well, under very general conditions. Moreover, these cost-free signals are better for all participants than the previously explored alternatives. Recent empirical evidence suggests that begging is energetically inexpensive for nestling birds; this finding led some researchers to question the applicability of the costly signaling framework to nestling begging. Our results show that cost-free or inexpensive signals, as observed empirically, fall within the framework of signaling theory.
菲利普·西德尼爵士博弈已被众多作者用来展示信号成本如何促进亲属之间的诚实信号传递。在此，我们证明，在这个博弈中，在非常一般的条件下，无成本的诚实信号也是可能的。此外，这些无成本信号对所有参与者来说都比之前探讨的替代方案更好。最近的实证证据表明，雏鸟乞食在能量消耗上成本较低；这一发现导致一些研究人员质疑成本信号框架对雏鸟乞食的适用性。我们的结果表明，从实证中观察到的无成本或低成本信号属于信号理论框架的范畴。
