Little M O
Philosophy Department, Georgetown University, Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Washington, D.C. 20057, USA.
J Med Philos. 1998 Apr;23(2):190-209. doi: 10.1076/jmep.23.2.190.8922.
In this paper, I urge that the very real lessons Carol Gilligan's work in moral psychology offer to moral philosophy can best be appreciated if we take seriously the gap between the two disciplines. The care and justice perspectives Gilligan explores are psychological orientations, and orientations are defined as much by matters of emphasis, selectivity of interpretation, and gestalt as they are by propositional commitment. As such, I argue, their contribution to moral theory is best seen as stances from which to do theory, rather than as constituting ready-made theories themselves. In pursuing this train of thought, I examine how Gilligan's work has developed over time and how, in the end, we should understand the juxtaposition between the two orientations.
在本文中，我主张，如果我们认真对待道德心理学与道德哲学这两个学科之间的差异，就能最好地领会卡罗尔·吉利根在道德心理学方面的研究给道德哲学带来的切实教训。吉利根所探究的关怀视角与正义视角是心理学取向，而取向的定义，在很大程度上既取决于侧重点、解释的选择性和整体形态等问题，也取决于命题承诺。因此，我认为，它们对道德理论的贡献最好被视为进行理论研究的立场，而非本身构成现成的理论。在探讨这一思路时，我审视了吉利根的研究如何随时间发展，以及最终我们应如何理解这两种取向之间的并列关系。
