Cavell M
Int J Psychoanal. 1998 Jun;79 ( Pt 3):449-67.
Some psychoanalysts now hold that an intersubjective model of the mind and of the analytic situation renders the ideas of truth, reality and objectivity obsolete. Arguing from a position of sympathy with this model, the author contends that nevertheless both a real, shared, external world and the concept of such a world are indispensable to propositional thought, and to the capacity to know one's own thoughts as thoughts, as a subjective perspective on the world. Without the idea of an objective world with which we are in touch and which we attempt to be more-or-less objective about, any so-called intersubjectivist model collapses into the one-person paradigm. The author traces a certain developmental line in twentieth-century philosophy that supports an intersubjective view, a line that shows the place of the normative ideas of truth and falsity, right and wrong, in the advent of mind; it attempts to disentangle the concept of truth from an authoritarian view that was implicit in Descartes; it points out connections, and a difference, between the view of triangulation that it argues for and the views espoused by a number of psychoanalysts. Some implications of this intersubjectivist position for psychoanalytic practice are considered; for instance: the interrelations between the analyst's third-person knowledge of her patient, and the patient's developing understanding of himself; and what the concept of unconscious fantasy presupposes.
现在一些精神分析学家认为，一种关于心灵和分析情境的主体间性模型使真理、现实和客观性的观念过时了。作者从对这一模型怀有同情的立场出发，认为尽管如此，一个真实的、共享的、外部的世界以及这样一个世界的概念对于命题思维以及将自己的思想作为对世界的主观视角来认识自己思想的能力而言都是不可或缺的。如果没有我们与之接触且我们试图或多或少客观对待的客观世界的观念，任何所谓的主体间性模型都会崩塌为一人范式。作者追溯了20世纪哲学中支持主体间性观点的一条特定发展脉络，这条脉络展示了真假、对错等规范性观念在心灵出现过程中的位置；它试图将真理的概念从笛卡尔隐含的权威主义观点中解脱出来；它指出了其主张的三角测量观点与一些精神分析学家所支持的观点之间的联系与差异。文中考虑了这种主体间性立场对精神分析实践的一些影响；例如：分析师对其患者的第三人称认识与患者对自身不断发展的理解之间的相互关系；以及无意识幻想的概念预设了什么。
