Wisniewski E J
University of North Carolina, USA.
Mem Cognit. 1998 Nov;26(6):1330-47. doi: 10.3758/bf03201205.
In four experiments, I examined how a property in one concept is transferred to a second concept during conceptual combination. The results suggest that people instantiate properties: that is, they use a specific representation of a property in the modifier concept to construct a new version of that property that is specific to the combination. If people are instantiating properties, then the modifier property should match its counterpart in the combination to the extent that the modifier and head noun are similar. This observation leads to a variety of predictions (supported by the experiments) about interpretations of similar and dissimilar combinations and about plausibility, preference, and similarity judgments associated with such interpretations. The results argue against an alternative view of transfer that posits that, in general, abstract representations of properties are copied from one concept to another. In this paper, I describe various processing accounts of instantiation and discuss the implications of the instantiation view for theories of metaphor, conceptual combination, and induction.
在四项实验中，我研究了在概念组合过程中，一个概念中的属性是如何转移到第二个概念上的。结果表明，人们会实例化属性：也就是说，他们会使用修饰概念中属性的特定表征来构建一个特定于该组合的该属性的新版本。如果人们正在实例化属性，那么修饰属性应在修饰词和中心名词相似的程度上与其在组合中的对应物相匹配。这一观察结果得出了关于相似和不相似组合的解释以及与此类解释相关的合理性、偏好和相似性判断的各种预测（实验予以支持）。结果反驳了另一种转移观点，该观点假定，一般而言，属性的抽象表征是从一个概念复制到另一个概念的。在本文中，我描述了实例化的各种处理方式，并讨论了实例化观点对隐喻理论、概念组合和归纳的影响。
