Cherubini P, Garnham A, Oakhill J, Morley E
Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Padua, Italy.
Cognition. 1998 Dec;69(2):179-218. doi: 10.1016/s0010-0277(98)00064-x.
According to one version of the mental models theory (Oakhill, J.V., Johnson-Laird, P.N., Garnham, A., 1989. Believability and syllogistic reasoning. Cognition 31, 117-140) beliefs exert their influence on reasoning in three ways. First they can affect the interpretation of the premises, for example by conversion. Second, they can curtail the search for alternative models of the premises, if an initial model supports a believable conclusion. Third, they can act as a filter on any conclusion that is eventually generated. This last influence is important in explaining the effects of belief bias in one-model syllogisms with no convertible premises, since such syllogisms, by definition, have no alternative models. However, the most natural interpretation of such a filter is that it filters out conclusions and leads to the response 'no valid conclusion'. The present study, which was conducted with groups of both British and Italian subjects, looked at the effect of prior knowledge on syllogistic reasoning, and showed that: (1) invalid conclusions for such one model syllogisms, either thematic or abstract, are typically not of the type 'no valid conclusion', but state invalid relations between the end terms; (2) belief-bias is completely suppressed when previous knowledge is incompatible with the premises, and therefore the premises themselves are always considered. The results are compatible with a version of the mental models theory in which a representation of prior knowledge precedes modelling of the premises, which are then incorporated into the representation of this knowledge. The relation between this theory and other accounts of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning, and the implications of these findings for reasoning more generally, are considered.
根据心智模型理论的一个版本（奥克希尔，J.V.，约翰逊 - 莱尔德，P.N.，加纳姆，A.，1989年。可信度与三段论推理。《认知》31卷，第117 - 140页），信念通过三种方式对推理产生影响。首先，它们可以影响对前提的解释，例如通过转换。其次，如果初始模型支持一个可信的结论，它们可以减少对前提替代模型的搜索。第三，它们可以对最终生成的任何结论起到过滤作用。最后这种影响对于解释在没有可转换前提的单模型三段论中信念偏差的影响很重要，因为根据定义，此类三段论没有替代模型。然而，对这种过滤作用最自然的解释是它过滤掉结论并导致“没有有效结论”的回答。本研究对英国和意大利的受试者群体进行了调查，研究了先验知识对三段论推理的影响，并表明：（1）对于此类单模型三段论（无论是主题性的还是抽象的），无效结论通常不是“没有有效结论”这种类型，而是陈述了端项之间的无效关系；（2）当先验知识与前提不兼容时，信念偏差会被完全抑制，因此总是会考虑前提本身。这些结果与心智模型理论的一个版本相符，在该版本中，先验知识的表征先于前提的建模，然后前提被纳入这种知识的表征中。本文还考虑了该理论与三段论推理中信念偏差的其他解释之间的关系，以及这些发现对更一般推理的启示。
