Newstead S E, Pollard P, Evans J S, Allen J L
Department of Psychology, University of Plymouth, UK.
Cognition. 1992 Dec;45(3):257-84. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(92)90019-e.
In studies of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, an interaction between logical validity and the believability of the conclusion has been found; in essence, logic has a larger effect on unbelievable than on believable conclusions. Two main explanations have been proposed for this finding. The selective scrutiny account claims that people focus on the conclusion and only engage in logical processing if this is found to be unbelievable; while the misinterpreted necessity account claims that subjects misunderstand what is meant by logical necessity and respond on the basis of believability when indeterminate syllogisms are presented. Experiments 1 and 2 compared the predictions of these two theories by examining whether the interaction would disappear if only determinate syllogisms were used. It did, thus providing strong support for the misinterpreted necessity explanation. However, the results are also consistent with a version of the mental models theory, and so Experiment 3 was carried out to compare these two explanations. The mental models theory received strong support, as it did also in the follow-up Experiments 4 and 5. It is concluded that people try to construct a mental model of the premises but, if there is a believable conclusion consistent with the first model they produce, then they fail to construct alternative models.
在三段论推理中信念偏差效应的研究里，已发现逻辑有效性与结论可信度之间存在一种交互作用；从本质上讲，逻辑对不可信结论的影响比对可信结论的影响更大。针对这一发现，人们提出了两种主要解释。选择性审查理论认为，人们会关注结论，并且只有当结论不可信时才会进行逻辑推理；而错误解读必然性理论则认为，当呈现不确定的三段论时，实验对象会误解逻辑必然性的含义，并根据结论的可信度做出反应。实验1和实验2通过检验如果只使用确定的三段论，这种交互作用是否会消失，来比较这两种理论的预测。结果确实如此，从而为错误解读必然性解释提供了有力支持。然而，这些结果也与心智模型理论的一个版本相一致，因此进行了实验3来比较这两种解释。心智模型理论得到了有力支持，在后续的实验4和实验5中也是如此。研究得出的结论是，人们试图构建前提的心智模型，但是，如果存在一个与他们生成的第一个模型一致的可信结论，那么他们就不会构建替代模型。
