Oakhill J, Johnson-Laird P N, Garnham A
Cognition. 1989 Mar;31(2):117-40. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277(89)90020-6.
In this paper we investigate the locus of believability effects in syllogistic reasoning. We identify three points in the reasoning process at which such effects could occur: the initial interpretation of premises, the examination of alternative representations of them (in all of which any valid conclusion must be true), and the "filtering" of putative conclusions. The effect of beliefs at the first of these loci is well established. In this paper we report three experiments that examine whether beliefs have an effect at the other two loci. In experiments 1 and 2 subjects drew their own conclusions from syllogisms that suggested believable or unbelievable ones. In the third experiment they evaluated conclusions that were presented to them. The data show that beliefs both affect the examination of alternative models and act as a filter on putative conclusions. We conclude by showing how some types of problem and some problem contents make the existence of alternative models more obvious than others.
在本文中，我们研究了三段论推理中可信度效应的轨迹。我们确定了推理过程中可能出现此类效应的三个点：前提的初始解释、对前提的替代表征的审视（在所有这些表征中，任何有效结论都必定为真）以及对假定结论的“筛选”。在这些点中的第一个点上，信念的影响已得到充分证实。在本文中，我们报告了三项实验，这些实验检验信念在其他两个点上是否产生影响。在实验1和实验2中，受试者从暗示可信或不可信结论的三段论中得出自己的结论。在第三个实验中，他们对呈现给他们的结论进行评估。数据表明，信念既影响对替代模型的审视，又对假定结论起到筛选作用。我们通过说明某些类型的问题和某些问题内容如何使替代模型的存在比其他情况更明显来得出结论。
