Morrison A B, Liston A J, Abbott J D
Can Med Assoc J. 1976 Nov 6;115(9):A-D.
This paper explains the Canadian decision process following the isolation and identification of A/New Jersey/8/76 at Fort Dix, New Jersey in February 1976. The cause for concern was the emergence of a swine-like strain related to that which caused the 1918-19 pandemic, together with proved man-to-man transmission. This concern was reinforced since all new influenza A strains known to have infected the number of persons involved at Fort Dix have become strains of epidemic importance. The Fort Dix outbreak gave sufficient warning to allow implementation of a national vaccination program, to prevent and protect against influenza. In the past such an opportunity had not occurred, and vaccine use had, at best, constituted an intervention in the course of an outbreak. The National Advisory Committee on Immunizing Agents had all available information when it reached its decision to recommend vaccination with bivalent (A/Victoria and A/New Jersey) or with monovalent (A/New Jersey) vaccine for selective, high-risk groups. This was an independent, scientifically based decision.
本文阐述了1976年2月在新泽西州迪克斯堡分离并鉴定出A/新泽西/8/76毒株后加拿大的决策过程。令人担忧的原因是出现了一种类似猪的毒株，该毒株与引发1918 - 19年大流行的毒株有关，且已证实存在人际传播。由于已知所有感染迪克斯堡涉事人数的新型甲型流感毒株都已成为具有流行重要性的毒株，这种担忧进一步加剧。迪克斯堡疫情发出了足够的预警，从而得以实施全国性疫苗接种计划，以预防流感并提供防护。在过去，从未出现过这样的机会，疫苗的使用充其量只是在疫情爆发过程中的一种干预措施。国家免疫制剂咨询委员会在做出为选择性高危人群推荐接种二价（A/维多利亚和A/新泽西）或单价（A/新泽西）疫苗的决定时，已掌握了所有可用信息。这是一个基于科学的独立决定。
