Towse A
Pharmacoeconomics. 1998 Mar;13(3):271-6. doi: 10.2165/00019053-199813030-00001.
Parallel trade in pharmaceuticals has become a major European Union policy issue with several 'solutions' being considered by the European Commission, Member State governments and the pharmaceutical industry in the 'Bangemann Process'. This paper discusses the issues from an economic and public policy perspective--considering the economic cases for differential pricing and for 'Euro-prices', concluding that the economic case for parallel trade--to achieve convergence of prices--is not applicable to pharmaceuticals. It argues that health economic evaluation is not an appropriate tool to set 'Euro-prices' because of differences in clinical practice and in resource use and cost across countries. Pricing rules should reflect local willingness to pay for innovation. It concludes, however, that in the absence of policy changes there is a strong likelihood of companies refusing to supply new innovative products at low prices to traditionally 'low price' countries in order to avoid parallel trade undermining prices obtained elsewhere in Europe, with significant implications for the welfare of patients in those countries.
药品平行贸易已成为欧盟的一个重大政策问题，欧盟委员会、成员国政府以及制药行业在“班格曼进程”中正在考虑多种“解决方案”。本文从经济和公共政策角度讨论这些问题——考量差别定价和“欧元价格”的经济案例，得出结论认为，药品平行贸易实现价格趋同的经济案例并不适用于药品。文章认为，由于各国临床实践、资源使用和成本存在差异，健康经济评估并非设定“欧元价格”的合适工具。定价规则应反映当地对创新的支付意愿。然而，文章得出结论称，在政策没有变化的情况下，企业很有可能拒绝以低价向传统“低价”国家供应新的创新产品，以避免平行贸易破坏在欧洲其他地区获得的价格，这将对这些国家患者的福利产生重大影响。
