Berrios G E, Sierra M
Department of Psychiatry, University of Cambridge, UK.
Hist Psychiatry. 1997 Jun;8(30 Pt 2):213-29. doi: 10.1177/0957154X9700803002.
As with other clinical phenomena, the historical analysis of the term, concepts and behaviours involved in the construction of 'depersonalization' should provide researchers with an essential frame for its empirical study. Before the term was coined in 1898, and under a variety of names, behaviours typical of 'depersonalization' were reported by Esquirol, Zeller, Billod, and Griesinger. The word 'depersonnalisation, derived from a usage in Amiel's Journal intime, was first used in a technical sense by Ludovic Dugas. The new disorder has since been explained as resulting from pathological changes in the sensory system, memory, affect, body image and self-experience. During the 1930s, evolutionary views became popular, particularly in the work of Mayer-Gross. The unclear conceptual boundaries of depersonalization still invite confusion and often enough fragments of what used to be its core-behaviour are used to diagnose the disorder. Depersonalization has of late become subsumed under the dissociative disorders. The definitional instability of the latter, however, has caused further complications to the study of depersonalization. It is recommended that the term is used to refer only to the original core-behaviour as this has shown adequate stability.
与其他临床现象一样，对“人格解体”构建过程中涉及的术语、概念和行为进行历史分析，应为研究人员提供其实证研究的基本框架。在1898年该术语被创造出来之前，埃斯基罗尔、泽勒、比洛德和格里辛格就曾以各种名称报道过“人格解体”的典型行为。“人格解体”一词源自阿米尔的《私人日记》中的用法，首次由卢多维克·迪加斯用于专业术语。此后，这种新的病症被解释为感觉系统、记忆、情感、身体意象和自我体验发生病理变化所致。在20世纪30年代，进化论观点开始流行，尤其是在迈耶-格罗斯的著作中。人格解体概念界限不明确，仍然容易造成混淆，过去常常被视为其核心行为的片段也被用来诊断这种病症。最近，人格解体被归入解离性障碍。然而，后者定义的不稳定性给人格解体的研究带来了进一步的复杂性。建议该术语仅用于指代最初的核心行为，因为这已显示出足够的稳定性。
