Gatowski S I, Dobbin S A, Richardson J T, Ginsburg G P, Merlino M L, Dahir V
Permanency Planning for Children Department, National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, P.O. Box 8970, University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada 89507, USA.
Law Hum Behav. 2001 Oct;25(5):433-58. doi: 10.1023/a:1012899030937.
Drawing on the responses provided by a survey of state court judges (N = 400), empirical evidence is presented with respect to judges' opinions about the Daubert criteria, their utility as decision-making guidelines, the level to which judges understand their scientific meaning, and how they might apply them when evaluating the admissibility of expert evidence. Proportionate stratified random sampling was used to obtain a representative sample of state court judges. Part I of the survey was a structured telephone interview (response rate of 71%) and in Part II, respondents had an option of completing the survey by telephone or receiving a questionnaire in the mail (response rate of 81%). Survey results demonstrate that judges overwhelmingly support the "gatekeeping" role as defined by Daubert, irrespective of the admissibility standard followed in their state. However, many of the judges surveyed lacked the scientific literacy seemingly necessitated by Daubert. Judges had the most difficulty operationalizing falsifiability and error rate, with only 5% of the respondents demonstrating a clear understanding of falsifiability and only 4% demonstrating a clear understanding of error rate. Although there was little consensus about the relative importance of the guidelines, judges attributed more weight to general acceptance as an admissibility criterion. Although most judges agreed that a distinction could be made between "scientific" and "technical or otherwise specialized" knowledge, the ability to apply the Daubert guidelines appeared to have little bearing on whether specific types of expert evidence were designated as "science" or "nonscience." Moreover, judges' "bench philosophy of science" seemed to reflect the rhetoric, rather than the substance, of Daubert. Implications of these results for the evolving relationship between science and law and the ongoing debates about Frye, Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho are discussed.
基于对州法院法官的一项调查（N = 400）所提供的回复，本文给出了实证证据，内容涉及法官对达伯特标准的看法、这些标准作为决策指南的效用、法官对其科学含义的理解程度，以及他们在评估专家证据的可采性时可能如何应用这些标准。采用按比例分层随机抽样来获取州法院法官的代表性样本。调查的第一部分是结构化电话访谈（回复率为71%），在第二部分中，受访者可以选择通过电话完成调查或通过邮件收到问卷（回复率为81%）。调查结果表明，无论其所在州遵循何种可采性标准，法官们都压倒性地支持达伯特所定义的“把关”角色。然而，许多接受调查的法官缺乏达伯特似乎所必需的科学素养。法官们在将可证伪性和错误率付诸实践方面最感困难，只有5%的受访者清楚理解可证伪性，只有4%的受访者清楚理解错误率。尽管对于这些指南的相对重要性几乎没有达成共识，但法官们更看重普遍接受作为一项可采性标准。虽然大多数法官同意可以区分“科学”知识和“技术或其他专业”知识，但应用达伯特指南的能力似乎与特定类型的专家证据是否被指定为“科学”或“非科学”几乎没有关系。此外，法官的“法庭科学理念”似乎反映的是达伯特的言辞，而非实质内容。本文讨论了这些结果对科学与法律之间不断演变的关系以及关于弗莱伊、达伯特、乔伊纳和锦湖等案持续辩论的影响。
