Bettelheim Eric C, D'Origny Gilonne
Mishcon de Reya, Summit House, 12 Red Lion Square, London WC1R 4QD, UK.
Philos Trans A Math Phys Eng Sci. 2002 Aug 15;360(1797):1827-51. doi: 10.1098/rsta.2002.1035.
The controversy over the issues of carbon sinks and emissions trading nearly aborted the Kyoto Protocol. The lengthy and intense debate over the roles that each are to play under the Protocol and the consequent political compromises has resulted in a complex set of provisions and an arcane nomenclature. The distinction drawn between the use of carbon sinks in developed countries under Joint Implementation and their use in developing countries under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a particular source of intricacy. It is at least arguable that key elements of the compromises reached at COP-6 and COP-7 in this regard are inconsistent with the terms of the Protocol and are ultra vires the Convention on Climate Change. This is a source of both uncertainty and potential legal challenge. Not only do the recent decisions create needless complexity, they also clearly discriminate against developing nations. Among the recent political compromises is the creation of a third type of non-bankable but tradeable unit with respect to forest management, which is only available to Annex I countries. The result is an anomalous one in which a variety of otherwise equivalent carbon credits can be generated under three different regimes including one, the CDM, that is subject to an elaborate regulatory overlay that discriminates against carbon sequestration by developing countries. For example, complying developed countries can essentially self-certify sequestration projects. In contrast, projects in developing countries must obtain prior approval from a subsidiary body, the CDM Executive Board, mandated to require detailed information and impose substantive and procedural hurdles not required or imposed by its companion body, the Article 6 Supervisory Committee on Joint Implementation Projects. The parallel and related debate over the third 'flexibility' mechanism, emissions trading, compounded the complexity of an already asymmetric and bifurcated system. The new requirements devoted to 'environmental integrity' not only have raised the costs of compliance of developing country projects but also virtually ignore the fundamental principle of sustainable economic growth and development embodied in the Convention and related international agreements. The regulations for carbon sinks now being formulated at Conferences of the Parties will have a significant impact on their use worldwide. Of key importance, in addition to their successful integration of carbon sinks and emissions trading into other international treaties, is the development of practically achievable and objective standards and an efficient and transparent approval process consistent with the terms of the Convention and the Protocol. Most important of all is a rebalancing that restores the primacy of addressing climate change in the context of sustainable economic growth and development.
围绕碳汇和排放交易问题的争议几乎使《京都议定书》夭折。关于各方在该议定书下所扮演角色的冗长而激烈的辩论以及随之而来的政治妥协,导致了一系列复杂的条款和晦涩的术语。在联合执行机制下发达国家对碳汇的使用与清洁发展机制(CDM)下发展中国家对碳汇的使用之间所做的区分,是复杂性的一个特别来源。至少可以说,在这方面第六届和第七届缔约方会议达成的妥协的关键要素与议定书的条款不一致,并且超出了《气候变化公约》的权限。这既是不确定性的来源,也是潜在法律挑战的来源。近期的决定不仅制造了不必要的复杂性,还明显歧视发展中国家。近期的政治妥协之一是针对森林管理设立了第三种不可交易但可转让的单位,且仅适用于附件一国家。结果是一种异常情况,即在三种不同制度下可以产生各种原本等效的碳信用额,其中一种制度即清洁发展机制,受到一套详尽的监管框架的约束,该框架歧视发展中国家的碳固存。例如,遵守规定的发达国家基本上可以自行认证固存项目。相比之下,发展中国家的项目必须事先获得一个附属机构——清洁发展机制执行理事会的批准,该理事会被授权要求提供详细信息,并设置实质性和程序性障碍,而其联合执行项目第六条监督委员会的对等机构则无需或未设置这些障碍。关于第三个“灵活性”机制——排放交易的平行且相关的辩论,加剧了一个本已不对称和二分的系统的复杂性。致力于“环境完整性”的新要求不仅提高了发展中国家项目的合规成本,还几乎忽视了《公约》及相关国际协定所体现的可持续经济增长与发展的基本原则。缔约方会议目前正在制定的碳汇法规将对其在全球的使用产生重大影响。除了将碳汇和排放交易成功纳入其他国际条约之外,制定切实可行且客观的标准以及符合《公约》和议定书条款的高效透明的批准程序也至关重要。最重要的是重新平衡,恢复在可持续经济增长与发展背景下应对气候变化的首要地位。