McElreath Richard
Department of Anthropology, University of California, Davis, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616-8522, USA.
J Theor Biol. 2003 Feb 7;220(3):345-57. doi: 10.1006/jtbi.2003.3166.
The outcomes of conflicts in many human societies generate reputation effects that influence the nature of later conflicts. Those willing to escalate over even trivial offenses are considered honorable whereas those who do not are considered dishonorable (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996). Here I extend Maynard Smith's hawk-dove model of animal conflict to explore the logic of a strategy which uses reputation about its opponents to regulate its behavior. I show that a reputation-based strategy does well when (1) the value of the resource is large relative to the cost of losing a fight, (2) communities are stable, and (3) reputations are well known but subject to some amount of error. Reputation-based strategies may thus result in greater willingness to fight, but less fighting at equilibrium, depending upon the nature of the contests and the local socioecology. Additionally, this strategy is robust in the presence of poor knowledge about reputation.
在许多人类社会中，冲突的结果会产生声誉效应，进而影响后续冲突的性质。那些即使对微不足道的冒犯也愿意升级冲突的人被视为可敬，而那些不愿意的人则被视为可耻（尼斯比特和科恩，1996年）。在此，我扩展了梅纳德·史密斯的动物冲突鹰鸽模型，以探究一种利用对手声誉来调节自身行为的策略的逻辑。我发现，当（1）资源价值相对于输掉一场战斗的成本而言很大，（2）群体稳定，以及（3）声誉广为人知但存在一定误差时，基于声誉的策略表现良好。因此，基于声誉的策略可能会导致更大的战斗意愿，但在平衡状态下战斗较少，这取决于竞争的性质和当地的社会生态学。此外，在对声誉了解不足的情况下，这种策略依然稳健。
