Flynn Kathryn E, Smith Maureen A, Davis Margaret K
University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA.
Med Care Res Rev. 2002 Dec;59(4):455-81. doi: 10.1177/107755802237811.
Many strategies are commonly used to influence physician behavior in managed care organizations. This review examines the effectiveness of three mechanisms to influence physician behavior: financial incentives directed at providers or patients, policies/procedures for managing care, and the selection/education of both providers and patients. The authors reach three conclusions. First, all health care systems use financial incentives, but these mechanisms are shifting away from financial incentives directed at the physician to those directed at the consumer. Second, heavily procedural strategies such as utilization review and gatekeeping show some evidence of effectiveness but are highly unpopular due to their restrictions on physician and patient choice. Third, a future system built on consumer choice is contradicted by mechanisms that rely solely on narrow networks of providers or the education of physicians. If patients become the new locus of decision making in health care, provider-focused mechanisms to influence physician behavior will not disappear but are likely to decline in importance.
在管理式医疗组织中,人们通常采用多种策略来影响医生的行为。本综述考察了三种影响医生行为的机制的有效性:针对医疗服务提供者或患者的经济激励措施、医疗管理的政策/程序,以及医疗服务提供者和患者的选择/教育。作者得出了三个结论。第一,所有医疗保健系统都使用经济激励措施,但这些机制正从针对医生的经济激励转向针对消费者的经济激励。第二,诸如利用审查和把关等高度程序化的策略显示出一定的有效性证据,但因其对医生和患者选择的限制而极不受欢迎。第三,基于消费者选择构建的未来系统与仅依赖狭窄的医疗服务提供者网络或医生教育的机制相矛盾。如果患者成为医疗保健决策的新核心,那么以医疗服务提供者为重点的影响医生行为的机制不会消失,但重要性可能会下降。