Pragmatism, bioethics and the grand American social experiment.

There is tension in bioethics between two strains of pragmatism. The most prominent strain, following John Dewey, proposes a content-rich ethos of controlled, collective moral inquiry. A second strain, descending from Charles Peirce and Josiah Royce, favors an open-ended approach where diverging moral communities evolve without extensive inter-communal oversight. This essay defends the second strain. The Deweyan approach, I argue, exhibits a problematic quasi-foundationalist character insofar as it canonizes a dubious constellation of "liberal" political values and seeks to establish these values by interposing a consensus of moral experts where genuine inter-communal dialogue, and compromise, would be more fruitful. I hold that the alternative approach of Peirce and Royce is preferable, and truer to the fundamental commitments of classical American pragmatism. Recognizing the epistemic fallibility of various content-rich moral-political formulations, Peirce and Royce hope to cultivate and sustain moral inquiry by allowing each moral community (1) to generate and test its own moral system (as long as it does so peaceably) and (2) to freely make or refuse to make collaborative arrangements with other moral communities. This approach is illustrated in a brief discussion of the Oregon Medical Experiment.