Trotter Griffin
Saint Louis University, St. Louis, MO 63104, USA.
J Med Philos. 2003 Oct-Dec;28(5-6):655-71. doi: 10.1076/jmep.28.5.655.18818.
By articulating a Peircean strain of bioethical inquiry, Elizabeth Cooke admirably attempts to avert the anti-realism, subjectivism and focus on consensus that afflict much so-called "pragmatic" bioethics. Yet, like many of her Deweyan colleagues, she falls prey to the egalitarian conviction that inquiry should be undertaken by huge numbers of like-minded individuals, proceeding in accordance with an authoritative canon of rules of discourse. In this essay, I argue that Cooke's egalitarianism is inconsistent with her apparent commitment to Peirce, and that an alternative, libertarian account of inquiry is better and truer to Peirce.
通过阐述一种皮尔士式的生物伦理探究路径，伊丽莎白·库克令人钦佩地试图避免困扰许多所谓“实用主义”生物伦理的反现实主义、主观主义以及对共识的关注。然而，和她许多秉持杜威思想的同行一样，她也陷入了平等主义的信念，即探究应由大量志同道合的个体进行，并按照一套权威性的话语规则规范来推进。在本文中，我认为库克的平等主义与她表面上对皮尔士的信奉并不一致，并且一种替代性的、自由主义的探究解释更符合皮尔士的思想，也更真实。
