Bauch Chris T, Galvani Alison P, Earn David J D
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, Canada L8S 4K1.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2003 Sep 2;100(18):10564-7. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1731324100. Epub 2003 Aug 14.
The recent threat of bioterrorism has fueled debate on smallpox vaccination policy for the United States. Certain policy proposals call for voluntary mass vaccination; however, if individuals decide whether to vaccinate according to self-interest, the level of herd immunity achieved may differ from what is best for the population as a whole. We present a synthesis of game theory and epidemic modeling that formalizes this conflict between self-interest and group interest and shows that voluntary vaccination is unlikely to reach the group-optimal level. This shortfall results in a substantial increase in expected mortality after an attack.
近期生物恐怖主义的威胁引发了美国关于天花疫苗接种政策的争论。某些政策提议呼吁进行自愿大规模接种；然而，如果个人根据自身利益决定是否接种，所实现的群体免疫水平可能与对整个人口最有利的水平有所不同。我们提出了一种博弈论与流行病建模的综合方法，将这种自身利益与群体利益之间的冲突形式化，并表明自愿接种不太可能达到群体最优水平。这种不足导致袭击后预期死亡率大幅上升。
