Gibbs R W
Program in Experimental Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz 95064.
Psychol Rev. 1992 Jul;99(3):572-7; discussion 578-81. doi: 10.1037/0033-295x.99.3.572.
Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) have proposed a class-inclusion model of metaphor comprehension. This theory suggests that metaphors are not understood as implicit similes but are seen as class-inclusion statements in which the topic of a metaphor is assigned to a diagnostic, ad hoc category, whereas the metaphor's vehicle is a prototypical member of that category. The author claims that verbal metaphors are not simply instantiations of temporary, ad hoc categories but reflect preexisting conceptual mappings in long-term memory that are metaphorically structured. Various evidence from cognitive linguistics, philosophy, and psychology are described in support of this claim. Evidence is also presented that supports, contrary to Glucksberg and Keysar's position, the role of tacit conceptual metaphors in the comprehension of verbal metaphors in discourse.
格鲁克斯伯格和凯萨尔（1990）提出了一种隐喻理解的类别包含模型。该理论认为，隐喻并非被理解为隐含的明喻，而是被视为类别包含陈述，其中隐喻的主题被归入一个诊断性的、临时的类别，而隐喻的喻体是该类别的一个典型成员。作者声称，言语隐喻不仅仅是临时的、特设类别的实例，而是反映了长期记忆中预先存在的、具有隐喻结构的概念映射。文中描述了来自认知语言学、哲学和心理学的各种证据来支持这一观点。同时也给出了证据，与格鲁克斯伯格和凯萨尔的观点相反，这些证据支持了隐性概念隐喻在语篇中言语隐喻理解中的作用。
