Gopalakrishna Gowri, Choo Philip, Leo Yee Sin, Tay Boon Keng, Lim Yean Teng, Khan Ali S, Tan Chorh Chuan
Ministry of Health, College of Medicine Building, 16 College Road, Singapore 169854, Republic of Singapore.
Emerg Infect Dis. 2004 Mar;10(3):395-400. doi: 10.3201/eid1003.030650.
An outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was detected in Singapore at the beginning of March 2003. The outbreak, initiated by a traveler to Hong Kong in late February 2003, led to sequential spread of SARS to three major acute care hospitals in Singapore. The critical factor in containing this outbreak was early detection and complete assessment of movements and follow-up of patients, healthcare workers, and visitors who were contacts. Visitor records were important in helping identify exposed persons who could carry the infection into the community. In the three hospital outbreaks, three different containment strategies were used to contain spread of infection: closing an entire hospital, removing all potentially infected persons to a dedicated SARS hospital, and managing exposed persons in place. On the basis of this experience, if a nosocomial outbreak is detected late, a hospital may need to be closed in order to contain spread of the disease. Outbreaks detected early can be managed by either removing all exposed persons to a designated location or isolating and managing them in place.
2003年3月初,新加坡发现了严重急性呼吸综合征(SARS)疫情。此次疫情由一名于2003年2月下旬前往香港的旅行者引发,导致SARS在新加坡的三家主要急症医院相继传播。控制此次疫情的关键因素是早期发现以及对患者、医护人员和有接触史访客的行动进行全面评估和追踪。访客记录对于识别可能将感染带入社区的暴露人员非常重要。在这三起医院疫情中,采用了三种不同的控制策略来遏制感染传播:关闭整所医院、将所有可能感染的人员转移至专门的SARS医院,以及就地管理暴露人员。基于这一经验,如果医院感染爆发发现较晚,可能需要关闭医院以控制疾病传播。早期发现的疫情可以通过将所有暴露人员转移至指定地点或就地隔离并管理来处理。