Fennelly Kevin P, Davidow Amy L, Miller Shelly L, Connell Nancy, Ellner Jerrold J
Department of Medicine, New Jersey Medical School-UMDNJ, Newark, 07107-3000, USA.
Emerg Infect Dis. 2004 Jun;10(6):996-1002. doi: 10.3201/eid1006.020738.
The lack of identified exposures in 2 of the 11 cases of bioterrorism-related inhalation anthrax in 2001 raised uncertainty about the infectious dose and transmission of Bacillus anthracis. We used the Wells-Riley mathematical model of airborne infection to estimate 1) the exposure concentrations in postal facilities where cases of inhalation anthrax occurred and 2) the risk for infection in various hypothetical scenarios of exposure to B. anthracis aerosolized from contaminated mail in residential settings. These models suggest that a small number of cases of inhalation anthrax can be expected when large numbers of persons are exposed to low concentrations of B. anthracis. The risk for inhalation anthrax is determined not only by bacillary virulence factors but also by infectious aerosol production and removal rates and by host factors.
2001年发生的11例与生物恐怖主义相关的吸入性炭疽病例中,有2例未确定暴露源,这使得炭疽杆菌的感染剂量和传播情况存在不确定性。我们使用空气传播感染的韦尔斯-莱利数学模型来估计:1)发生吸入性炭疽病例的邮政设施中的暴露浓度;2)在住宅环境中接触受污染邮件气溶胶化的炭疽杆菌的各种假设情景下的感染风险。这些模型表明,当大量人员暴露于低浓度的炭疽杆菌时,预计会出现少数吸入性炭疽病例。吸入性炭疽的风险不仅取决于细菌的毒力因子,还取决于感染性气溶胶的产生和清除率以及宿主因素。