Greenwald A G
Department of Psychology, University of Washington, Seattle 98195.
Am Psychol. 1992 Jun;47(6):766-79. doi: 10.1037/0003-066x.47.6.766.
Recent research has established several empirical results that are widely agreed to merit description in terms of unconscious cognition. These findings come from experiments that use indirect tests for immediate or long-term residues of barely perceptible-but-unattended, or attended-but-forgotten events. Importantly, these well-established phenomena--insofar as they occur without initially involving focal attention--are limited to relatively minor cognitive feats. Unconscious cognition is now solidly established in empirical research, but it appears to be intellectually much simpler than the sophisticated agency portrayed in psychoanalytic theory. The strengthened position of unconscious cognitive phenomena can be related to their fit with the developing neural network (connectionist) theoretical framework in psychology.
最近的研究已得出若干实证结果,人们普遍认为这些结果值得从无意识认知的角度进行描述。这些发现来自一些实验,这些实验使用间接测试来检测刚刚察觉到但未予以关注、或者予以关注但已遗忘的事件的即时或长期残留影响。重要的是,这些已得到充分证实的现象——就其最初不涉及焦点注意力而言——仅限于相对较小的认知成就。无意识认知如今在实证研究中已得到稳固确立,但它在智力层面似乎比精神分析理论所描绘的复杂机制要简单得多。无意识认知现象的地位得到强化,这可能与它们契合心理学中不断发展的神经网络(联结主义)理论框架有关。