Fahrenfort Johannes Jacobus, Johnson Philippa A, Kloosterman Niels A, Stein Timo, van Gaal Simon
Department of Applied and Experimental Psychology, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Institute for Brain and Behavior Amsterdam (iBBA), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Elife. 2025 May 28;13:RP102335. doi: 10.7554/eLife.102335.
How consciousness arises from brain activity has been a topic of intense scientific research for decades. But how does one identify the neural basis of something that is intrinsically personal and subjective? A hallmark approach has been to ask human observers to judge stimuli as 'seen' (conscious) and 'unseen' (unconscious) and use post hoc sorting of neural measurements based these judgments. Unfortunately, cognitive and response biases are known to strongly affect how observers place their criterion for judging stimuli as 'seen' versus 'unseen', thereby confounding neural measures of consciousness. Surprisingly however, the effect of conservative and liberal criterion placement on neural measures of unconscious and conscious processing has never been explicitly investigated. Here, we use simulations and electrophysiological brain measurements to show that conservative criterion placement has an unintuitive consequence: rather than selectively providing a cautious estimate of conscious processing, it inflates effect sizes in neural measures of both conscious and unconscious processing, while liberal criterion placement does the reverse. After showing this in simulation, we performed decoding analyses on two electroencephalography studies that employ common subjective indicators of conscious awareness, in which we experimentally manipulated the response criterion. The results confirm that the predicted confounding effects of criterion placement on neural measures of unconscious and conscious processing occur in empirical data, while further showing that the most widely used subjective scale, the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS), does not guard against criterion confounds. Follow-up simulations explicate how the experimental context determines whether the relative confounding effect of criterion placement is larger in neural measures of either conscious or unconscious processing. We conclude that criterion placement threatens the construct validity of neural measures of conscious and unconscious processing.
几十年来,意识如何从大脑活动中产生一直是科学研究的热点话题。但是,如何确定某种本质上属于个人主观的事物的神经基础呢?一种标志性的方法是让人类观察者将刺激判断为“已看见”(有意识)和“未看见”(无意识),并根据这些判断对神经测量结果进行事后分类。不幸的是,已知认知和反应偏差会强烈影响观察者如何设定将刺激判断为“已看见”与“未看见”的标准,从而混淆意识的神经测量。然而,令人惊讶的是,保守和宽松标准设定对无意识和有意识加工的神经测量的影响从未得到明确研究。在这里,我们使用模拟和脑电生理测量表明,保守的标准设定会产生一个意想不到的结果:它不是选择性地谨慎估计有意识加工,而是会夸大有意识和无意识加工的神经测量中的效应大小,而宽松的标准设定则相反。在模拟中展示这一点之后,我们对两项采用意识觉知常见主观指标的脑电图研究进行了解码分析,在这些研究中我们通过实验操纵了反应标准。结果证实,标准设定对无意识和有意识加工的神经测量的预测混淆效应在实证数据中确实存在,同时进一步表明最广泛使用的主观量表——感知觉意识量表(PAS)——并不能防范标准混淆。后续模拟阐明了实验背景如何决定标准设定的相对混淆效应在有意识或无意识加工的神经测量中是否更大。我们得出结论,标准设定威胁到有意识和无意识加工的神经测量的结构效度。