Arminjon Mathieu
Service de Psychiatrie de l'Enfant et de l'Adolescent, Hôpitaux Universitaires de Genève Genève, Switzerland.
Front Psychol. 2011 Jun 20;2:125. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00125. eCollection 2011.
In the 1980s, the terms "cognitive unconscious" were invented to denominate a perspective on unconscious mental processes independent from the psychoanalytical views. For several reasons, the two approaches to unconscious are generally conceived as irreducible. Nowadays, we are witnessing a certain convergence between both fields. The aim of this paper consists in examining the four basic postulates of Freudian unconscious at the light of neurocognitive sciences. They posit: (1) that some psychological processes are unconsciously performed and causally determine conscious processes, (2) that they are governed by their own cognitive rules, (3) that they set out their own intentions, (4) and that they lead to a conflicting organization of psyche. We show that each of these postulates is the subject of empirical and theoretical works. If the two fields refer to more or less similar mechanisms, we propose that their opposition rests on an epistemological misunderstanding. As a conclusion, we promote a conservative reunification of the two perspectives.
20世纪80年代，“认知无意识”这一术语被创造出来，用于指称一种独立于精神分析观点的无意识心理过程视角。出于多种原因，这两种无意识研究方法通常被认为是不可简化的。如今，我们正在见证这两个领域之间的某种趋同。本文的目的在于根据神经认知科学审视弗洛伊德无意识的四个基本假设。它们假定：（1）某些心理过程是在无意识状态下进行的，并对意识过程产生因果性影响；（2）它们受自身认知规则的支配；（3）它们有自己的意图；（4）它们导致心理的冲突性组织。我们表明，这些假设中的每一个都是实证和理论研究的主题。如果这两个领域或多或少涉及相似的机制，我们认为它们之间的对立基于一种认识论上的误解。作为结论，我们主张对这两种视角进行保守的统一。
