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来自增强生态现实主义的惊人进化预测。

Surprising evolutionary predictions from enhanced ecological realism.

作者信息

Dieckmann Ulf, Metz Johan A J

机构信息

Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria.

出版信息

Theor Popul Biol. 2006 May;69(3):263-81. doi: 10.1016/j.tpb.2005.12.001. Epub 2006 Feb 15.

DOI:10.1016/j.tpb.2005.12.001
PMID:16469342
Abstract

A focus on the eco-evolutionary feedback continually operating between a population's evolution and its environment helps to appreciate the generality of ESS theory. Here we illustrate, through a sequence of four examples, how respecting such feedback in the evolutionary dynamics of quantitative traits may result in qualitatively unexpected outcomes. Reviewing existing insights and complementing these with new results, we show (1) that evolutionary matrix games are fundamentally degenerate and allow a natural unfolding, (2) that selection-driven extinction may not be rare in nature, (3) that evolutionary epidemiology should not rely on R0 maximization, and (4) why the occurrence of Hardy-Weinberg proportions generically requires an evolutionary explanation.

摘要

关注种群进化与其环境之间持续运行的生态进化反馈,有助于理解ESS理论的普遍性。在此,我们通过四个例子来说明,在数量性状的进化动态中考虑这种反馈如何可能导致定性上意想不到的结果。回顾现有见解并辅以新结果,我们表明:(1)进化矩阵博弈本质上是退化的,并允许自然展开;(2)选择驱动的灭绝在自然界中可能并不罕见;(3)进化流行病学不应依赖于R0最大化;(4)哈迪-温伯格比例的出现通常需要一个进化解释的原因。

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