Apaloo J
Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science, St. Francis Xavier University, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, Canada B2G 2W5.
J Theor Biol. 2009 Mar 7;257(1):84-9. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.10.029. Epub 2008 Nov 8.
An evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is only required to be capable of resisting invasion by rare mutant strategies. In contrast, an absolute invader strategy (AIS) is a rare mutant strategy that can invade any established strategy. We show that the predictions of the outcome of evolution made by optimization models are compatible with those made by the classical expected payoff comparisons in matrix games. We also show that if a matrix game has an AIS that AIS is unique and is also an ESS. But an ESS need not be an AIS. In pure-strategy submodels, an AIS need not be unique. An AIS of a matrix game has global asymptotic stability property in the game dynamics which involve only pure strategies including the AIS.
进化稳定策略（ESS）仅需能够抵御罕见突变策略的入侵。相比之下，绝对入侵策略（AIS）是一种能够入侵任何既定策略的罕见突变策略。我们表明，优化模型对进化结果的预测与矩阵博弈中经典的预期收益比较所做出的预测是兼容的。我们还表明，如果一个矩阵博弈有一个AIS，那么这个AIS是唯一的，并且也是一个ESS。但一个ESS不一定是AIS。在纯策略子模型中，一个AIS不一定是唯一的。矩阵博弈的一个AIS在仅涉及包括该AIS在内的纯策略的博弈动态中具有全局渐近稳定性属性。
