Barrett H Clark, Kurzban Robert
Department of Anthropology, University of California-Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA.
Psychol Rev. 2006 Jul;113(3):628-47. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.113.3.628.
Modularity has been the subject of intense debate in the cognitive sciences for more than 2 decades. In some cases, misunderstandings have impeded conceptual progress. Here the authors identify arguments about modularity that either have been abandoned or were never held by proponents of modular views of the mind. The authors review arguments that purport to undermine modularity, with particular attention on cognitive architecture, development, genetics, and evolution. The authors propose that modularity, cleanly defined, provides a useful framework for directing research and resolving debates about individual cognitive systems and the nature of human evolved cognition. Modularity is a fundamental property of living things at every level of organization; it might prove indispensable for understanding the structure of the mind as well.
二十多年来，模块性一直是认知科学中激烈争论的主题。在某些情况下，误解阻碍了概念的进步。在这里，作者们识别出了那些关于模块性的论点，这些论点要么已被抛弃，要么从未被心智模块观的支持者所持有。作者们回顾了那些旨在削弱模块性的论点，特别关注认知结构、发展、遗传学和进化。作者们提出，清晰定义的模块性为指导研究以及解决关于个体认知系统和人类进化认知本质的争论提供了一个有用的框架。模块性是生物在每个组织层次上的基本属性；它可能对于理解心智的结构也至关重要。
