Li Jennifer S, Eisenstein Eric L, Grabowski Henry G, Reid Elizabeth D, Mangum Barry, Schulman Kevin A, Goldsmith John V, Murphy M Dianne, Califf Robert M, Benjamin Daniel K
Department of Pediatrics, Duke Clinical Research Institute, Duke University, Durham, NC 27705, USA.
JAMA. 2007 Feb 7;297(5):480-8. doi: 10.1001/jama.297.5.480.
In 1997, Congress authorized the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to grant 6-month extensions of marketing rights through the Pediatric Exclusivity Program if industry sponsors complete FDA-requested pediatric trials. The program has been praised for creating incentives for studies in children and has been criticized as a "windfall" to the innovator drug industry. This critique has been a substantial part of congressional debate on the program, which is due to expire in 2007.
To quantify the economic return to industry for completing pediatric exclusivity trials.
A cohort study of programs conducted for pediatric exclusivity. Nine drugs that were granted pediatric exclusivity were selected. From the final study reports submitted to the FDA (2002-2004), key elements of the clinical trial design and study operations were obtained, and the cost of performing each study was estimated and converted into estimates of after-tax cash outflows. Three-year market sales were obtained and converted into estimates of after-tax cash inflows based on 6 months of additional market protection. Net economic return (cash inflows minus outflows) and net return-to-costs ratio (net economic return divided by cash outflows) for each product were then calculated.
Net economic return and net return-to-cost ratio.
The indications studied reflect a broad representation of the program: asthma, tumors, attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, hypertension, depression/generalized anxiety disorder, diabetes mellitus, gastroesophageal reflux, bacterial infection, and bone mineralization. The distribution of net economic return for 6 months of exclusivity varied substantially among products (net economic return ranged from -$8.9 million to $507.9 million and net return-to-cost ratio ranged from -0.68 to 73.63).
The economic return for pediatric exclusivity is variable. As an incentive to complete much-needed clinical trials in children, pediatric exclusivity can generate lucrative returns or produce more modest returns on investment.
1997年,国会授权美国食品药品监督管理局(FDA),如果行业赞助商完成FDA要求的儿科试验,可通过儿科独占计划给予6个月的市场销售权延期。该计划因鼓励了儿童用药研究而受到赞誉,但也被批评为创新制药行业的“意外之财”。这种批评一直是国会关于该计划辩论的重要内容,该计划将于2007年到期。
量化完成儿科独占试验给行业带来的经济回报。
一项针对儿科独占计划的队列研究。选取了9种获得儿科独占权的药物。从提交给FDA的最终研究报告(2002 - 2004年)中,获取了临床试验设计和研究操作的关键要素,估算了每项研究的成本,并将其转换为税后现金流出的估计值。获取了三年的市场销售额,并根据额外6个月的市场保护期将其转换为税后现金流入的估计值。然后计算了每种产品的净经济回报(现金流入减去现金流出)和净成本回报率(净经济回报除以现金流出)。
净经济回报和净成本回报率。
所研究的适应症广泛代表了该计划:哮喘、肿瘤、注意力缺陷多动障碍、高血压、抑郁/广泛性焦虑症、糖尿病、胃食管反流、细菌感染和骨矿化。6个月独占期的净经济回报在不同产品之间差异很大(净经济回报从 - 890万美元到5.079亿美元不等,净成本回报率从 - 0.68到73.63不等)。
儿科独占的经济回报各不相同。作为完成儿童急需的临床试验的一种激励措施,儿科独占可能产生丰厚的回报,也可能产生较为适度的投资回报。