Bork Kristian H, Halkjaer-Knudsen Vibeke, Hansen John-Erik Stig, Heegaard Erik D
The Centre for Biological Defence, Statens Serum Institut, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Biosecur Bioterror. 2007 Mar;5(1):62-71. doi: 10.1089/bsp.2006.0026.
This article investigates the extent to which biosecurity measures are recognized and have been implemented in the Nordic countries, in the absence of formalized security standards and legislation. Two trials were undertaken: first, a broad combined biosafety and biosecurity questionnaire survey of the Nordic countries, and, second, a focused on-site audit of 22 facilities, with 94 laboratories, in Denmark. Both trials indicated that external security had been partially implemented but that little attention had been paid to internal security and the establishment of biosecurity. It was demonstrated that the backgrounds and identities of insiders were rarely checked and that they could have gained access to both pathogen inventory lists and freezers in many facilities. In 81% of pathogen-containing facilities, pathogens were not routinely and centrally accounted for. The authors recommend the establishment of a legal framework congruent with international standards and obligations; novel governmental national biosecurity authorities, requiring a fusion of both microbiological and technical expertise and legislative powers; and the formulation of a new code of conduct termed "Good Biosecurity Practice."
本文调查了在缺乏正式安全标准和立法的情况下，北欧国家对生物安全措施的认知程度以及这些措施的实施情况。开展了两项试验：其一，对北欧国家进行了一项广泛的生物安全与生物安保综合问卷调查；其二，对丹麦的22个设施（其中有94个实验室）进行了针对性的现场审核。两项试验均表明，外部安全措施已部分实施，但对内部安全和生物安保体系的建立关注甚少。结果显示，很少对内部人员的背景和身份进行核查，他们在许多设施中都能够获取病原体清单和冰柜的信息。在81%的存有病原体的设施中，病原体并未进行常规的集中清点。作者建议建立一个与国际标准和义务相一致的法律框架；设立新型政府国家生物安保机构，该机构需要融合微生物学和技术专业知识以及立法权；并制定一部名为“良好生物安保规范”的新行为准则。
