Bernstein Daniel M, Harley Erin M
University of Washington, Box 351525, Seattle, WA 98195, USA.
Memory. 2007 Jul;15(5):548-60. doi: 10.1080/09658210701390701.
We tested a fluency-misattribution theory of visual hindsight bias, and examined how perceptual and conceptual fluency contribute to the bias. In Experiment 1a observers identified celebrity faces that began blurred and then clarified (Forward baseline), or indicated when faces that began clear and then blurred were no longer recognisable (Backward baseline). In surprise memory tests that followed, observers adjusted the degree of blur of each face to match what the faces looked like when identified in the corresponding baseline condition. Hindsight bias was observed in the Forward condition: During the memory test observers adjusted the faces to be more blurry than when originally identified during baseline. These same observers did not show hindsight bias in the Backward condition: Here, they adjusted faces to the exact blur level at which they identified the faces during baseline. Experiment 1b tested a combined condition in which faces were viewed in a Forward progression at baseline but in a Backward progression at test. Hindsight bias was observed in this condition but was significantly less than the bias observed in the Experiment 1a Forward condition. Experiments 1a and 1b provide support for the fluency-misattribution account of visual hindsight bias: When observers are made aware of why fluency has been enhanced (i.e., in the Backward condition) they are better able to discount it, and as a result show reduced or no hindsight bias. In Experiment 2, observers viewed faces in a Forward progression at baseline and then in a Forward upright or inverted progression at test. Hindsight bias occurred in both conditions, but was greater for upright than inverted faces. We conclude that both conceptual and perceptual fluency contribute to visual hindsight bias.
我们测试了视觉后见之明偏差的流畅性错误归因理论，并研究了感知流畅性和概念流畅性如何导致这种偏差。在实验1a中，观察者识别从模糊开始然后变得清晰的名人面孔（正向基线），或者指出从清晰开始然后变得模糊的面孔何时不再可识别（反向基线）。在随后的惊喜记忆测试中，观察者调整每张面孔的模糊程度，使其与在相应基线条件下识别时面孔的样子相匹配。在正向条件下观察到了后见之明偏差：在记忆测试中，观察者将面孔调整得比在基线期间最初识别时更模糊。同样的观察者在反向条件下没有表现出后见之明偏差：在这里，他们将面孔调整到在基线期间识别面孔时的精确模糊水平。实验1b测试了一种组合条件，即在基线时以正向顺序观看面孔，但在测试时以反向顺序观看。在这种条件下观察到了后见之明偏差，但明显小于在实验1a正向条件下观察到的偏差。实验1a和1b为视觉后见之明偏差的流畅性错误归因解释提供了支持：当观察者意识到流畅性增强的原因时（即反向条件），他们能够更好地忽略它，结果后见之明偏差减少或不存在。在实验2中，观察者在基线时以正向顺序观看面孔，然后在测试时以正向直立或倒置顺序观看。在两种条件下都出现了后见之明偏差，但直立面孔的偏差大于倒置面孔。我们得出结论，概念流畅性和感知流畅性都导致了视觉后见之明偏差。
