Whitney Paul, Rinehart Christa A, Hinson John M
Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164-4820, USA.
Psychon Bull Rev. 2008 Dec;15(6):1179-84. doi: 10.3758/PBR.15.6.1179.
Framing effects occur in a wide range of laboratory and natural decision contexts, but the underlying processes that produce framing effects are not well understood. We explored the role of working memory (WM) in framing by manipulating WM loads during risky decisions. After starting with a hypothetical stake of money, participants were then presented a lesser amount that they could keep for certain (positive frame) or lose for certain (negative frame). They made a choice between the sure amount and a gamble in which they could either keep or lose all of the original stake. On half of the trials, the choice was made while maintaining a concurrent WM load of random letters. In both load and no-load conditions, we replicated the typical finding of risk aversion with positive frames and risk seeking with negative frames. In addition, people made fewer decisions to accept the gamble under conditions of higher cognitive load. The data are congruent with a dual-process reasoning framework in which people employ a heuristic to make satisfactory decisions with minimal effort.
框架效应在广泛的实验室和自然决策情境中都会出现，但产生框架效应的潜在过程尚未得到很好的理解。我们通过在风险决策过程中操纵工作记忆（WM）负荷，探讨了工作记忆在框架效应中的作用。在以一笔假设的金钱赌注开始后，参与者随后会看到一笔较少的金额，他们可以确定地保留这笔钱（正面框架）或确定地失去这笔钱（负面框架）。他们要在确定金额和一场赌博之间做出选择，在这场赌博中他们要么保留要么失去所有的原始赌注。在一半的试验中，参与者要在维持随机字母的并发工作记忆负荷的情况下做出选择。在有负荷和无负荷条件下，我们都重现了正面框架下风险规避以及负面框架下风险寻求的典型发现。此外，在认知负荷较高的情况下，人们接受赌博的决策更少。这些数据与一种双过程推理框架相一致，即人们采用启发式方法以最小的努力做出令人满意的决策。
