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情感在道德心理学中的作用。

The role of emotion in moral psychology.

作者信息

Huebner Bryce, Dwyer Susan, Hauser Marc

机构信息

Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155, USA.

出版信息

Trends Cogn Sci. 2009 Jan;13(1):1-6. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2008.09.006. Epub 2008 Dec 6.

Abstract

Recent work in the cognitive and neurobiological sciences indicates an important relationship between emotion and moral judgment. Based on this evidence, several researchers have argued that emotions are the source of our intuitive moral judgments. However, despite the richness of the correlational data between emotion and morality, we argue that the current neurological, behavioral, developmental and evolutionary evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that emotion is necessary for making moral judgments. We suggest instead, that the source of moral judgments lies in our causal-intentional psychology; emotion often follows from these judgments, serving a primary role in motivating morally relevant action.

摘要

认知科学和神经生物学领域最近的研究表明,情绪与道德判断之间存在重要联系。基于这一证据,一些研究人员认为,情绪是我们直觉道德判断的来源。然而,尽管情绪与道德之间的相关数据丰富,但我们认为,目前的神经学、行为学、发育学和进化学证据不足以证明情绪是做出道德判断所必需的。相反,我们认为道德判断的来源在于我们的因果意向心理学;情绪往往源于这些判断,在激发与道德相关的行动中起主要作用。

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