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高昂的惩罚并不总是能增进合作。

Costly punishment does not always increase cooperation.

作者信息

Wu Jia-Jia, Zhang Bo-Yu, Zhou Zhen-Xing, He Qiao-Qiao, Zheng Xiu-Deng, Cressman Ross, Tao Yi

机构信息

Key Laboratory of Animal Ecology and Conservation Biology, Centre for Computational Biology and Evolution, Institute of Zoology, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100101, China.

出版信息

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2009 Oct 13;106(41):17448-51. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0905918106. Epub 2009 Sep 28.

Abstract

In a pairwise interaction, an individual who uses costly punishment must pay a cost in order that the opponent incurs a cost. It has been argued that individuals will behave more cooperatively if they know that their opponent has the option of using costly punishment. We examined this hypothesis by conducting two repeated two-player Prisoner's Dilemma experiments, that differed in their payoffs associated to cooperation, with university students from Beijing as participants. In these experiments, the level of cooperation either stayed the same or actually decreased when compared with the control experiments in which costly punishment was not an option. We argue that this result is likely due to differences in cultural attitudes to cooperation and punishment based on similar experiments with university students from Boston that found cooperation did increase with costly punishment.

摘要

在两两互动中,使用代价高昂的惩罚手段的个体必须付出代价,以使对手也付出代价。有人认为,如果个体知道对手可以选择使用代价高昂的惩罚手段,他们的行为会更具合作性。我们以北京的大学生为参与者,通过进行两个重复的两人囚徒困境实验来检验这一假设,这两个实验在与合作相关的收益方面有所不同。在这些实验中,与不存在代价高昂的惩罚手段的对照实验相比,合作水平要么保持不变,要么实际上有所下降。我们认为,这一结果可能是由于基于对波士顿大学生进行的类似实验所发现的文化对合作和惩罚的态度差异造成的,在那些实验中发现合作确实随着代价高昂的惩罚手段而增加。

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