Palo Alto Medical Foundation Research Institute, 795 El Camino Real, Palo Alto, CA 94301, USA.
Health Serv Res. 2010 Apr;45(2):553-64. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6773.2009.01072.x. Epub 2009 Dec 31.
To examine the effects of incentive payment frequency on quality measures in a physician-specific pay-for-performance (P4P) experiment.
A multispecialty physician group practice.
In 2007, all primary care physicians (n=179) were randomized into two study arms differing by the frequency of incentive payment, either four quarterly bonus checks or a single year-end bonus (maximum of U.S.$5,000/year for both arms).
DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHODS: Data were extracted from electronic health records. Quality measure scores between the two arms over four quarters were compared.
There was no difference between the two arms in average quality measure score or in total bonus amount earned.
Physicians' responses to a P4P program with a small maximum bonus do not differ by frequency of bonus payment.
在一项针对医生的按绩效付费（P4P）试验中，考察激励支付频率对质量指标的影响。
一家多专科医生集团。
2007 年，所有初级保健医生（n=179）被随机分为两组，激励支付频率不同，要么每季度发放四次奖金支票，要么年终发放一次奖金（两臂的奖金最高均为 5000 美元/年）。
数据收集/提取方法：从电子健康记录中提取数据。比较了两组在四个季度内的平均质量指标得分。
两组之间的平均质量指标得分或总奖金收入没有差异。
对于最高奖金数额较小的 P4P 计划，医生的反应与奖金支付频率无关。
