Psychology Research Unit, Kingston University London, Kingston upon Thames, Surrey KT1 2EE, United Kingdom.
Cognition. 2010 Apr;115(1):54-70. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2009.11.008. Epub 2010 Jan 12.
A recent study by Apperly et al. (2006) found evidence that adults do not automatically infer false beliefs while watching videos that afford such inferences. This method was extended to examine true beliefs, which are sometimes thought to be ascribed by "default" (e.g., Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). Sequences of pictures were presented in which the location of an object and a character's belief about the location of the object often changed. During the picture sequences participants responded to an unpredictable probe picture about where the character believed the object to be located or where the object was located in reality. In Experiment 1 participants were not directly instructed to track the character's beliefs about the object. There was a significant reaction time cost for belief probes compared with matched reality probes, whether the character's belief was true or false. In Experiment 2, participants were asked to track where the character thought the object was located, responses to belief probes were faster than responses to reality probes, suggesting that the difference observed in Experiment 1 was not due to intrinsic differences between the probes, but was more likely to be due to participants inferring beliefs ad hoc in response to the probe. In both Experiments 1 and 2, responses to belief and reality probes were faster in the true belief condition than in the false belief condition. In Experiment 3 this difference was largely eliminated when participants had fewer reasons to make belief inferences spontaneously. These two lines of evidence are neatly explained by the proposition that neither true nor false beliefs are ascribed automatically, but that belief ascription may occur spontaneously in response to task demands.
阿普尔利等人(2006 年)最近的一项研究发现,成年人在观看可以进行此类推断的视频时,不会自动推断错误的信念。这种方法被扩展到了考察真实信念,有时人们认为真实信念是默认的(例如,Leslie 和 Thaiss,1992)。呈现了一系列图片,其中物体的位置和角色对物体位置的信念经常发生变化。在图片序列中,参与者会对一个不可预测的探测图片做出反应,该图片询问角色认为物体位于何处或物体实际上位于何处。在实验 1 中,参与者没有被直接指示跟踪角色对物体的信念。无论角色的信念是真还是假,与匹配的现实探测相比,信念探测的反应时间都有显著的成本。在实验 2 中,要求参与者跟踪角色认为物体所在的位置,对信念探测的反应比对现实探测的反应更快,这表明实验 1 中观察到的差异不是由于探测本身的内在差异,而是更可能是由于参与者根据探测临时推断出信念。在实验 1 和 2 中,对信念和现实探测的反应在真实信念条件下比在虚假信念条件下更快。在实验 3 中,当参与者有较少的自发进行信念推断的理由时,这种差异在很大程度上消除了。这两条证据都被一个命题很好地解释了,即既不是真实信念也不是错误信念是自动归因的,但归因可能是自发的,以响应任务需求。