Schlaich C, Sevenich C, Gau B
Hamburg Port Health Center, Zentralinstitut für Arbeitsmedizin und Maritime Medizin, Hamburg, Germany.
Gesundheitswesen. 2012 Mar;74(3):145-53. doi: 10.1055/s-0030-1270502. Epub 2011 Feb 8.
After the World Health Organization issued a global alert for the occurrence of a novel pandemic influenza (H1N1) in 2009, most international airports in Germany implemented intensified public health measures to delay local transmission. At Hamburg airport it was decided not to implement a general entry and exit screening of all travelers during the pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009. Travelers were advised on symptoms and protective measures by public information displayed in the airport. A mobile Airport Medical Assessment Center (AMAC) for up to 260 persons was used which barred 6 gates from traffic for this reason. Travelers were medically examined by the public health authority after notification from the flight captain according to Article 28 (4) of the International Health Regulations or were referred to the medical assessment by other service providers such as the information desk in the airport. From May to August 2009 n=108 affected travelers were medically examined and advised by the public health authority at the airport. 9 out of 108 affected travelers (8.3%) who presented to the public health service at the airport were diagnosed with pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009. Overall, only 0.002% of all travelers through the airport in the given time-frame were seen by the service. Most of the affected travelers presented themselves to the public health service before embarkation or after disembarkation. On 6 occasions the pilots declared a person with illness on board to the public health authority. Out of the 6 persons 4 were diagnosed with pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009. In the case of notification, the delay in traveling for contact persons ranged from 30 min to 2 h. None of the sick travelers was referred to a hospital, all returned home. In addition to the medical assessment of affected travelers the public health authority issued "free-pratique" according to Article 28 (3) of the International Health Regulations, after talking to the cabin crew or flight captain. Out of 167 (0.3% of all flights to Hamburg) inspected airplanes only in one case was a notification not issued by the pilot despite a known case of sickness on the plane.
To avoid unnecessary interference with travel, the public health service at airports must be able to react in a timely manner to notifications of disease. During the influenza pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 4 out 9 (36%) of the cases that were diagnosed with pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 were notified to the public health authority via the aircraft. It is the authors' experience during the pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 that the notification requirement of the pilot is of importance because it enables the public health service to react before disembarkation. However, more often affected persons sought advice from the public health service before or after the flight. A prerequisite for this is that the public health service is known to the relevant bodies at the airport and accessible to the public. Routine health inspections of airplanes with visual inspection of travelers result in high manpower requirements. In the authors' view these routine inspections of airplanes are only justified if there is a suspicion of disease on board, or to train the staff of public health authorities. It can be concluded from the experiences during the pandemic influenza (H1N1) 2009 that the core capacities required for designated airports according to Annex 1 B of the International Health Regulations must include trained medical professionals, communication and transportation infrastructure amongst appropriate facilities. One must distinguish between medical facilities for some affected travelers in the public areas of the airport, and a medical assessment area in the security area of the airport that is appropriate for the number of persons that may be carried by the largest vessel to that destination.
2009年世界卫生组织发布全球新型大流行性流感(H1N1)警报后,德国多数国际机场实施强化公共卫生措施以延缓本地传播。汉堡机场决定在2009年大流行性流感(H1N1)期间不对所有旅客实施全面的出入境筛查。通过机场内展示的公共信息向旅客提供症状及防护措施建议。启用了一个可容纳多达260人的移动机场医疗评估中心(AMAC),为此封闭了6个登机口。根据《国际卫生条例》第28条(4)款,机长通报后,公共卫生当局对旅客进行医学检查,或由机场问询处等其他服务提供商转介至医疗评估处。2009年5月至8月,n = 108名受影响旅客在机场接受了公共卫生当局的医学检查并获建议。在机场向公共卫生服务机构求诊的108名受影响旅客中,9人(8.3%)被诊断感染2009年大流行性流感(H1N1)。总体而言,在给定时间段内,通过该机场的所有旅客中只有0.002%接受了该服务。大多数受影响旅客在登机前或下机后向公共卫生服务机构求诊。有6次飞行员向公共卫生当局通报机上有患病人员。这6人中4人被诊断感染2009年大流行性流感(H1N1)。通报后,密切接触者的行程延误时间为30分钟至2小时。患病旅客均未被转诊至医院,全部返家。除了对受影响旅客进行医学评估外,公共卫生当局在与机组人员或机长交谈后,根据《国际卫生条例》第28条(3)款发布了“免予检疫”证明。在167架(占所有飞往汉堡航班的0.3%)接受检查的飞机中,只有一次尽管飞机上已知有病例,但飞行员未进行通报。
为避免对旅行造成不必要干扰,机场公共卫生服务机构必须能够及时对疾病通报做出反应。在2009年甲型H1N1流感大流行期间,9例被诊断感染2009年大流行性流感(H1N1)的病例中有4例(36%)是通过飞机向公共卫生当局通报的。根据作者在2009年大流行性流感(H1N1)期间的经验,飞行员的通报要求很重要,因为这使公共卫生服务机构能够在下机前做出反应。然而,更多情况下,受影响人员在飞行前或飞行后向公共卫生服务机构咨询。前提是机场相关机构了解公共卫生服务机构且公众能够使用该服务。对飞机进行常规健康检查并目视检查旅客会导致人力需求很高。作者认为,只有在怀疑机上有疾病或为培训公共卫生当局工作人员时,对飞机进行这些常规检查才合理。从2009年大流行性流感(H1N1)期间的经验可以得出结论,根据《国际卫生条例》附件1 B指定的机场所需的核心能力必须包括训练有素的医学专业人员、通信和运输基础设施以及适当的设施。必须区分机场公共区域为一些受影响旅客设立的医疗设施,以及机场安全区域内与前往该目的地的最大航班可能搭载的人数相适应的医疗评估区域。