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行为经济学对公共部门养老金计划的看法。

Behavioral economics perspectives on public sector pension plans.

作者信息

Beshears John, Choi James J, Laibson David, Madrian Brigitte C

机构信息

Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA 94305-5015, USA and NBER, (

出版信息

J Pension Econ Financ. 2011 Apr;10(2):315-336. doi: 10.1017/S1474747211000114.

DOI:10.1017/S1474747211000114
PMID:21789032
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3142276/
Abstract

We describe the pension plan features of the states and the largest cities and counties in the U.S. Unlike in the private sector, defined benefit (DB) pensions are still the norm in the public sector. However, a few jurisdictions have shifted toward defined contribution (DC) plans as their primary savings plan, and fiscal pressures are likely to generate more movement in this direction. Holding fixed a public employee's work and salary history, we show that DB retirement income replacement ratios vary greatly across jurisdictions. This creates large variation in workers' need to save for retirement in other accounts. There is also substantial heterogeneity across jurisdictions in the savings generated in primary DC plans because of differences in the level of mandatory employer and employee contributions. One notable difference between public and private sector DC plans is that public sector primary DC plans are characterized by required employee or employer contributions (or both), whereas private sector plans largely feature voluntary employee contributions that are supplemented by an employer match. We conclude by applying lessons from savings behavior in private sector savings plans to the design of public sector plans.

摘要

我们描述了美国各州以及最大城市和县的养老金计划特点。与私营部门不同,固定收益(DB)养老金在公共部门仍是常态。然而,一些司法管辖区已转向固定缴款(DC)计划作为其主要储蓄计划,财政压力可能会促使更多地区朝这个方向转变。在固定公共雇员的工作和薪资历史的情况下,我们表明,不同司法管辖区的DB退休收入替代率差异很大。这导致工人在其他账户为退休储蓄的需求差异巨大。由于强制性雇主和雇员缴款水平的差异,各司法管辖区在主要DC计划中产生的储蓄也存在很大异质性。公共部门和私营部门DC计划的一个显著差异在于,公共部门主要DC计划的特点是要求雇员或雇主缴款(或两者都要求),而私营部门计划主要是雇员自愿缴款,并由雇主匹配缴款作为补充。我们通过将私营部门储蓄计划中的储蓄行为经验教训应用于公共部门计划的设计来得出结论。

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