Tooby J, Cosmides L
J Pers. 1990 Mar;58(1):17-67. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1990.tb00907.x.
The concept of a universal human nature, based on a species-typical collection of complex psychological adaptations, is defended as valid, despite the existence of substantial genetic variation that makes each human genetically and biochemically unique. These apparently contradictory facts can be reconciled by considering that (a) complex adaptations necessarily require many genes to regulate their development, and (b) sexual recombination makes it improbable that all the necessary genes for a complex adaptation would be together at once in the same individual, if genes coding for complex adaptations varied substantially between individuals. Selection, interacting with sexual recombination, tends to impose relative uniformity at the functional level in complex adaptive designs, suggesting that most heritable psychological differences are not themselves likely to be complex psychological adaptations. Instead, they are mostly evolutionary by-products, such as concomitants of parasite-driven selection for biochemical individuality. An evolutionary approach to psychological variation reconceptualizes traits as either the output of species-typical, adaptively designed development and psychological mechanisms, or as the result of genetic noise creating perturbations in these mechanisms.
基于复杂心理适应的物种典型集合的普遍人性概念，尽管存在大量基因变异，使每个人在基因和生化上都独一无二，但仍被认为是有效的。考虑到以下两点，这些明显矛盾的事实可以得到调和：（a）复杂适应必然需要许多基因来调节其发育；（b）如果编码复杂适应的基因在个体之间有很大差异，有性重组使得复杂适应所需的所有必要基因不太可能同时出现在同一个体中。选择与有性重组相互作用，倾向于在复杂适应性设计的功能层面强加相对一致性，这表明大多数可遗传的心理差异本身不太可能是复杂的心理适应。相反，它们大多是进化的副产品，比如寄生虫驱动的生化个体性选择的伴随产物。一种关于心理变异的进化方法将性状重新概念化为物种典型的、适应性设计的发育和心理机制的输出，或者是在这些机制中产生扰动的基因噪声的结果。
