How can group experience influence the cue priority? A re-examination of the ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis.

Since the discovery of the "framing effect" by Kahneman and Tversky, the sensitivity of the "framing effect" - its appearance and in some cases its disappearance - has long been an object of study. However there is little agreement as to the reasons for this sensitivity. The "ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis" (Wang, 2008) aims to systematically explain the sensitivity of this effect by paying particular attention to people's cue priority: it states that the framing effect occurs when verbal framing is used to compensate for the absence of higher prioritized decision cues. The main purpose of our study is to examine and develop this hypothesis by examining cue priority given differences in people's "group experience." The main result is that the framing effect is absent when the choice problem is presented in a group context that reflects the actual size of the group that the participant has had experience with. Thus, in order to understand the choices that people make in life and death decisions, it is important to incorporate the decision maker's group experience explicitly into the ambiguity-ambivalence hypothesis.