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实验将沟通与惩罚选项相结合,展示了个体如何克服社会困境。

Experiments combining communication with punishment options demonstrate how individuals can overcome social dilemmas.

机构信息

Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47408, USA.

出版信息

Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):33-4. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001282.

DOI:10.1017/S0140525X11001282
PMID:22289323
Abstract

Guala raises important questions about the misinterpretation of experimental studies that have found that subjects engage in costly punishment. Instead of positing that punishment is the solution for social dilemmas, earlier research posited that when individuals facing a social dilemma agreed on their own rules and used graduated sanctions, they were more likely to have robust solutions over time.

摘要

瓜拉提出了一些重要的问题,这些问题涉及到对那些发现实验对象会进行昂贵惩罚的实验研究的误解。更早的研究提出,当面对社会困境的个人自行制定规则并使用渐进式制裁时,他们更有可能随着时间的推移而找到强有力的解决方案,而不是假设惩罚是解决社会困境的方法。

相似文献

1
Experiments combining communication with punishment options demonstrate how individuals can overcome social dilemmas.实验将沟通与惩罚选项相结合,展示了个体如何克服社会困境。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):33-4. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001282.
2
Retaliation and antisocial punishment are overlooked in many theoretical models as well as behavioral experiments.在许多理论模型和行为实验中,报复和反社会惩罚都被忽视了。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):24. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001221.
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The strategic logic of costly punishment necessitates natural field experiments, and at least one such experiment exists.昂贵惩罚的策略逻辑需要自然现场实验,至少存在一个这样的实验。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):31-2. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11000926.
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In the lab and the field: punishment is rare in equilibrium.在实验室和实地研究中:在均衡状态下,惩罚是罕见的。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):26-8. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001415.
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The punishment that sustains cooperation is often coordinated and costly.维持合作的惩罚通常是协调和有代价的。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):20-1. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X1100118X.
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Costs and benefits in hunter-gatherer punishment.狩猎采集者的惩罚的成本与收益。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):19-20. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001403.
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Examining punishment at different explanatory levels.考察不同解释水平的惩罚。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):23-4. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X1100121X.
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Reciprocity and uncertainty.互惠与不确定性。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):18-9. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001178.
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Punishing for your own good: the case of reputation-based cooperation.为了自身利益而惩罚:基于声誉的合作案例。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):40-1. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001336.
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Special human vulnerability to low-cost collective punishment.特殊的人类对低成本集体惩罚的脆弱性。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):37-8. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11000896.

引用本文的文献

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The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling.合作的语言:声誉与诚实信号。
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2021 Nov 22;376(1838):20200286. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0286. Epub 2021 Oct 4.
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Gossip Versus Punishment: The Efficiency of Reputation to Promote and Maintain Cooperation.流言蜚语与惩罚:声誉在促进和维持合作方面的有效性
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