为了自身利益而惩罚：基于声誉的合作案例。

Punishing for your own good: the case of reputation-based cooperation.

机构信息

Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04013 Leipzig, Germany.

出版信息

Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):40-1. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001336.

Abstract

Contrary to Guala, I claim that several mechanisms can explain punishment in humans. Here I focus on reputation-based cooperation--and I explore how it can lead to punishment under situations that may or may not be perceived as being anonymous. Additionally, no particular mechanism stands out in predicting an excess of punishment under constrained lab conditions.

摘要

与瓜拉相反，我认为有几种机制可以解释人类的惩罚行为。在这里，我专注于基于声誉的合作——并探讨它如何在可能被视为匿名或不被视为匿名的情况下导致惩罚。此外，在预测受限实验室条件下过度惩罚的情况时，没有任何特定的机制显得尤为突出。