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为了自身利益而惩罚:基于声誉的合作案例。

Punishing for your own good: the case of reputation-based cooperation.

机构信息

Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology, 04013 Leipzig, Germany.

出版信息

Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):40-1. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001336.

DOI:10.1017/S0140525X11001336
PMID:22289331
Abstract

Contrary to Guala, I claim that several mechanisms can explain punishment in humans. Here I focus on reputation-based cooperation--and I explore how it can lead to punishment under situations that may or may not be perceived as being anonymous. Additionally, no particular mechanism stands out in predicting an excess of punishment under constrained lab conditions.

摘要

与瓜拉相反,我认为有几种机制可以解释人类的惩罚行为。在这里,我专注于基于声誉的合作——并探讨它如何在可能被视为匿名或不被视为匿名的情况下导致惩罚。此外,在预测受限实验室条件下过度惩罚的情况时,没有任何特定的机制显得尤为突出。

相似文献

1
Punishing for your own good: the case of reputation-based cooperation.为了自身利益而惩罚:基于声誉的合作案例。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):40-1. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001336.
2
Lab support for strong reciprocity is weak: punishing for reputation rather than cooperation.实验室对强互惠的支持很薄弱:为了声誉而惩罚,而不是为了合作。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):39. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11000884.
3
Retaliation and antisocial punishment are overlooked in many theoretical models as well as behavioral experiments.在许多理论模型和行为实验中,报复和反社会惩罚都被忽视了。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):24. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001221.
4
Reciprocity and uncertainty.互惠与不确定性。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):18-9. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001178.
5
The social structure of cooperation and punishment.合作与惩罚的社会结构。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):28-9. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11000914.
6
Culture: the missing piece in theories of weak and strong reciprocity.文化:弱互惠和强互惠理论中的缺失环节。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):35-6. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001300.
7
The social and psychological costs of punishing.惩罚的社会和心理代价。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):15-6. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001142.
8
Experiments combining communication with punishment options demonstrate how individuals can overcome social dilemmas.实验将沟通与惩罚选项相结合,展示了个体如何克服社会困境。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):33-4. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001282.
9
The strategic logic of costly punishment necessitates natural field experiments, and at least one such experiment exists.昂贵惩罚的策略逻辑需要自然现场实验,至少存在一个这样的实验。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):31-2. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11000926.
10
In the lab and the field: punishment is rare in equilibrium.在实验室和实地研究中:在均衡状态下,惩罚是罕见的。
Behav Brain Sci. 2012 Feb;35(1):26-8. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X11001415.

引用本文的文献

1
Both loved and feared: third party punishers are viewed as formidable and likeable, but these reputational benefits may only be open to dominant individuals.既受人爱戴又令人畏惧:第三方惩罚者被视为强大且讨人喜欢,但这些声誉上的好处可能只对占主导地位的个体开放。
PLoS One. 2014 Oct 27;9(10):e110045. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0110045. eCollection 2014.
2
Rejection of unfair offers can be driven by negative emotions, evidence from modified ultimatum games with anonymity.不公平提议的拒绝可能是由负面情绪驱动的,匿名修正最后通牒博弈实验提供了证据。
PLoS One. 2012;7(6):e39619. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0039619. Epub 2012 Jun 28.