Potochnik Angela
Department of Philosophy, University of Cincinnati, 206 McMicken Hall, Cincinnati, OH 45221-0374, USA.
Stud Hist Philos Biol Biomed Sci. 2012 Mar;43(1):202-8. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2011.10.035. Epub 2011 Nov 29.
When game theory was introduced to biology, the components of classic game theory models were replaced with elements more befitting evolutionary phenomena. The actions of intelligent agents are replaced by phenotypic traits; utility is replaced by fitness; rational deliberation is replaced by natural selection. In this paper, I argue that this classic conception of comprehensive reapplication is misleading, for it overemphasizes the discontinuity between human behavior and evolved traits. Explicitly considering the representational roles of evolutionary game theory brings to attention areas of overlap that are often neglected, and so a range of evolutionary possibilities that are often overlooked. The clarifications this analysis provides are well illustrated by-and particularly valuable for-game theoretic treatments of the evolution of social behavior.
当博弈论被引入生物学时，经典博弈论模型的组成部分被更适合进化现象的元素所取代。智能主体的行动被表型特征所取代；效用被适应性所取代；理性思考被自然选择所取代。在本文中，我认为这种全面重新应用的经典概念具有误导性，因为它过度强调了人类行为与进化特征之间的不连续性。明确考虑进化博弈论的表征作用会使人们注意到那些经常被忽视的重叠领域，以及一系列经常被忽略的进化可能性。这种分析所提供的澄清通过社会行为进化的博弈论处理得到了很好的说明，并且对其尤为有价值。
