Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN 37996, USA.
Ecol Lett. 2012 May;15(5):406-14. doi: 10.1111/j.1461-0248.2012.01747.x. Epub 2012 Mar 4.
Incentive payments to private landowners provide a common strategy to conserve biodiversity and enhance the supply of goods and services from ecosystems. To deliver cost-effective improvements in biodiversity, payment schemes must trade-off inefficiencies that result from over-simplified policies with the administrative burden of implementing more complex incentive designs. We examine the effectiveness of different payment schemes using field parameterized, ecological economic models of extensive grazing farms. We focus on profit maximising farm management plans and use bird species as a policy-relevant indicator of biodiversity. Common policy simplifications result in a 49-100% loss in biodiversity benefits depending on the conservation target chosen. Failure to differentiate prices for conservation improvements in space is particularly problematic. Additional implementation costs that accompany more complicated policies are worth bearing even when these constitute a substantial proportion (70% or more) of the payments that would otherwise have been given to farmers.
向私人土地所有者提供激励付款是保护生物多样性和提高生态系统提供的商品和服务供应的常用策略。为了实现具有成本效益的生物多样性改善,支付计划必须权衡因过于简化的政策而导致的效率低下问题,以及实施更复杂激励设计的行政负担。我们使用广泛放牧农场的现场参数化生态经济模型来研究不同支付计划的有效性。我们专注于利润最大化的农场管理计划,并使用鸟类物种作为与生物多样性相关的政策指标。根据选择的保护目标,常见的政策简化会导致生物多样性效益损失 49-100%。未能区分空间保护改善的价格尤其成问题。即使这些成本构成了原本要支付给农民的款项的很大一部分(70%或更多),伴随更复杂政策而来的额外实施成本也是值得承担的。