Decock Lieven, Douven Igor
Rev Philos Psychol. 2011 Mar;2(1):61-75. doi: 10.1007/s13164-010-0035-y. Epub 2010 Jun 26.
In a famous critique, Goodman dismissed similarity as a slippery and both philosophically and scientifically useless notion. We revisit his critique in the light of important recent work on similarity in psychology and cognitive science. Specifically, we use Tversky's influential set-theoretic account of similarity as well as Gärdenfors's more recent resuscitation of the geometrical account to show that, while Goodman's critique contained valuable insights, it does not warrant a dismissal of similarity.
在一篇著名的评论中，古德曼摒弃了相似性这一概念，认为它难以捉摸，在哲学和科学上均无用处。鉴于近期心理学和认知科学领域关于相似性的重要研究成果，我们重新审视他的评论。具体而言，我们运用特沃斯基颇具影响力的相似性集合论观点以及加登福斯对几何观点的最新复兴理论，来表明尽管古德曼的评论包含了宝贵的见解，但它并不足以成为摒弃相似性的理由。
