Northoff Georg
Mind, Brain Imaging and Neuroethics Research Unit, Institute of Mental Health Research, University of Ottawa Ottawa, ON, Canada.
Front Psychol. 2012 Aug 31;3:303. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00303. eCollection 2012.
The James-Lange theory considers emotional feelings as perceptions of physiological body changes. This approach has recently resurfaced and modified in both neuroscientific and philosophical concepts of embodiment of emotional feelings. In addition to the body, the role of the environment in emotional feeling needs to be considered. I here claim that the environment has not merely an indirect and instrumental, i.e., modulatory role on emotional feelings via the body and its sensorimotor and vegetative functions. Instead, the environment may have a direct and non-instrumental, i.e., constitutional role in emotional feelings. This implies that the environment itself is constitutive of emotional feeling rather than the bodily representation of the environment. I call this the relational concept of emotional feeling. The present paper discusses recent data from neuroimaging that investigate emotions in relation to interoceptive processing and the brain's intrinsic activity. These data show the intrinsic linkage of interoceptive stimulus processing to both exteroceptive stimuli and the brain's intrinsic activity. This is possible only if the differences between intrinsic activity and intero- and exteroceptive stimuli is encoded into neural activity. Such relational coding makes possible the assignment of subjective and affective features to the otherwise objective and non-affective stimulus. I therefore consider emotions to be intrinsically affective and subjective as it is manifest in emotional feelings. The relational approach thus goes together with what may be described as neuro-phenomenal approach. Such neuro-phenomenal approach does not only inform emotions and emotional feeling but is also highly relevant to better understand the neuronal mechanisms underlying consciousness in general.
詹姆斯-兰格理论将情绪感受视为对身体生理变化的感知。这种方法最近在情绪感受体现的神经科学和哲学概念中重新出现并得到了修正。除了身体之外,还需要考虑环境在情绪感受中的作用。我在此主张,环境对情绪感受不仅具有间接的、工具性的,即通过身体及其感觉运动和植物性功能的调节作用。相反,环境在情绪感受中可能具有直接的、非工具性的,即构成性的作用。这意味着环境本身构成了情绪感受,而不是环境的身体表征。我将此称为情绪感受的关系概念。本文讨论了来自神经成像的最新数据,这些数据研究了与内感受处理和大脑内在活动相关的情绪。这些数据显示了内感受刺激处理与外感受刺激以及大脑内在活动之间的内在联系。只有当内在活动与内感受和外感受刺激之间的差异被编码为神经活动时,这才有可能。这种关系编码使得将主观和情感特征赋予原本客观且无情感的刺激成为可能。因此,我认为情绪本质上是具有情感和主观性的,正如在情绪感受中所表现的那样。关系方法因此与可被描述为神经现象学方法的内容相一致。这种神经现象学方法不仅为情绪和情绪感受提供了信息,而且对于更好地理解一般意识背后的神经元机制也高度相关。