Department of Mathematics and Statistics, Room 437 MacNaughton Building, University of Guelph, 50 Stone Road East, Guelph, ON N1G 2W1, Canada.
Comput Math Methods Med. 2012;2012:652562. doi: 10.1155/2012/652562. Epub 2012 Dec 5.
Behavior-incidence models have been used to model phenomena such as free-riding vaccinating behavior, where nonvaccinators free ride on herd immunity generated by vaccinators. Here, we develop and analyze a simulation model of voluntary ring vaccination on an evolving social contact network. Individuals make vaccination decisions by examining their expected payoffs, which are influenced by the infection status of their neighbors. We find that stochasticity can make outcomes extremely variable (near critical thresholds) and thus unpredictable: some stochastic realizations result in rapid control through ring vaccination while others result in widespread transmission. We also explore the phenomenon of outcome inelasticity, wherein behavioral responses result in certain outcome measures remaining relatively unchanged. Finally, we explore examples where ineffective or risky vaccines are more widely adopted than safe, effective vaccines. This occurs when such a vaccine is unattractive to a sufficient number of contacts of an index case to cause failure of ring vaccination. As a result, the infection percolates through the entire network, causing the final epidemic size and vaccine coverage to be higher than would otherwise occur. Effects such as extreme outcome variability and outcome inelasticity have implications for vaccination policies that depend on individual choice for their success and predictability.
行为发生率模型已被用于模拟诸如免费接种行为等现象,即在接种者产生的群体免疫效应下,未接种者搭便车。在这里,我们开发并分析了一个在不断发展的社会接触网络上进行自愿环形疫苗接种的模拟模型。个体通过检查其预期收益来做出疫苗接种决策,这些收益受到其邻居感染状况的影响。我们发现,随机性可能使结果变得非常多变(接近临界阈值),从而变得不可预测:一些随机实现导致通过环形疫苗接种迅速控制,而另一些则导致广泛传播。我们还探讨了结果弹性的现象,其中行为反应导致某些结果指标保持相对不变。最后,我们探讨了无效或有风险的疫苗比安全有效的疫苗更广泛采用的例子。当这样的疫苗对指数病例的足够数量的接触者没有吸引力,从而导致环形疫苗接种失败时,就会出现这种情况。结果,感染会在整个网络中传播,导致最终的疫情规模和疫苗接种覆盖率高于预期。极端结果可变性和结果弹性等效应对依赖个体选择的疫苗接种政策具有影响,这些政策的成功和可预测性取决于个体选择。