Philosophy Department, Emory University Atlanta, GA, USA.
Front Integr Neurosci. 2012 Dec 18;6:114. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2012.00114. eCollection 2012.
Recent Social Intuitionist work suggests that moral judgments are intuitive (not based on conscious deliberation or any significant chain of inference), and that the reasons we produce to explain or justify our judgments and actions are for the most part post hoc rationalizations rather than the actual source of those judgments. This is consistent with work on judgment and explanation in other domains, and it correctly challenges one-sidedly rationalistic accounts. We suggest that in fact reasoning has a great deal of influence on moral judgments and on intuitive judgments in general. This influence is not apparent from study of judgments simply in their immediate context, but it is crucial for the question of how cognition can help us avoid deleterious effects and enhance potentially beneficial effects of affect on judgment, action, and cognition itself. We begin with established work on several reactive strategies for cognitive control of affect (e.g., suppression, reappraisal), then give special attention to more complex sorts of conflict ("extended deliberation") involving multiple interacting factors, both affective and reflective. These situations are especially difficult to study in a controlled way, but we propose some possible experimental approaches. We then review proactive strategies for control, including avoidance of temptation and mindfulness meditation (Froeliger et al., 2012, this issue). We give special attention to the role of slow or "cool" cognitive processes (e.g., deliberation, planning, and executive control) in the inculcation of long-term dispositions, traits, intuitions, skills, or habits. The latter are critical because they in turn give rise to a great many of our fast, intuitive judgments. The reasoning processes involved here are distinct from post hoc rationalizations and have a very real impact on countless intuitive judgments in concrete situations. This calls for a substantial enlargement of research on cognitive control, drawing on work in developmental psychology, automatization, educational theory, and other fields.
最近的社会直觉主义研究表明，道德判断是直觉的（不是基于有意识的思考或任何重要的推理链），而我们用来解释或证明我们的判断和行为的理由，在大多数情况下是事后合理化，而不是这些判断的实际来源。这与其他领域的判断和解释研究一致，正确地挑战了片面理性主义的解释。我们认为，事实上，推理对道德判断和一般的直觉判断有很大的影响。这种影响从对判断的直接研究中并不明显，但对于认知如何帮助我们避免情感对判断、行动和认知本身的有害影响，以及增强其潜在有益影响的问题至关重要。我们从几种用于认知控制情感的反应性策略（例如，抑制、重新评估）的已有研究开始，然后特别关注涉及多个相互作用的情感和反思因素的更复杂的冲突类型（“扩展的思考”）。这些情况特别难以用控制的方式进行研究，但我们提出了一些可能的实验方法。然后，我们回顾了用于控制的主动策略，包括避免诱惑和正念冥想（Froeliger 等人，2012，本期特刊）。我们特别关注缓慢或“冷静”认知过程（例如，思考、计划和执行控制）在长期倾向、特质、直觉、技能或习惯的培养中的作用。后者至关重要，因为它们反过来又产生了我们许多快速的、直觉的判断。这里涉及的推理过程与事后合理化不同，对具体情况下无数的直觉判断有非常实际的影响。这要求对认知控制的研究进行实质性扩大，借鉴发展心理学、自动化、教育理论和其他领域的工作。
