Suppr超能文献

公共困境中的退出、惩罚与奖励:一项实验研究。

Exit, punishment and rewards in commons dilemmas: an experimental study.

机构信息

Department of Social Studies, Linnaeus University, Växjö, Sweden.

出版信息

PLoS One. 2013 Aug 1;8(8):e69871. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0069871. Print 2013.

Abstract

Commons dilemmas are interaction situations where a common good is provided or exploited by a group of individuals so that optimal collective outcomes clash with private interests. Although in these situations, social norms and institutions exist that might help individuals to cooperate, little is known about the interaction effects between positive and negative incentives and exit options by individuals. We performed a modified public good game experiment to examine the effect of exit, rewards and punishment, as well as the interplay between exit and rewards and punishment. We found that punishment had a stronger effect than rewards on cooperation if considered by itself, whereas rewards had a stronger effect when combined with voluntary participation. This can be explained in terms of the 'framing effect', i.e., as the combination of exit and rewards might induce people to attach higher expected payoffs to cooperative strategies and expect better behaviour from others.

摘要

公共困境是指在这种互动情境下,一群人提供或利用共同利益,从而使最优的集体结果与个人利益发生冲突。尽管在这些情况下,可能存在有助于个人合作的社会规范和制度,但对于个人的积极和消极激励以及退出选择之间的相互作用知之甚少。我们进行了一项修改后的公共物品博弈实验,以检验退出、奖励和惩罚的效果,以及退出与奖励和惩罚之间的相互作用。我们发现,如果单独考虑,惩罚比奖励对合作的影响更大,而当与自愿参与相结合时,奖励的影响更大。这可以用“框架效应”来解释,即退出和奖励的结合可能会促使人们将更高的预期收益与合作策略联系起来,并期望他人表现更好。

文献AI研究员

20分钟写一篇综述,助力文献阅读效率提升50倍。

立即体验

用中文搜PubMed

大模型驱动的PubMed中文搜索引擎

马上搜索

文档翻译

学术文献翻译模型,支持多种主流文档格式。

立即体验